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ABSTRACT
Green technology developments bring public managers to the table with entrepreneurs
who want to promote new technologies and share regard for the public good. The
introduction of green technologies to the general public evidences that the challenge of
technological change spans to a sphere of social interactions that operate in the
breakthrough. This phase is best characterized as an inter-organizational process and my
research explores the patterns that emerge through it.
My research focuses on the development of a solar energy venture, the Solar-to-market
initiative based in Massachusetts. By treating the creation of this venture as a dynamic
system, I will highlight the role of public-private and third sector partnerships in shaping
policies and technology innovation. The core question of the research is addressed by
mapping out the networks that emerge throughout the process from project design to
implementation.
I urge public managers and entrepreneurs to consider the following aspects when
managing green technological environmental ventures: (1) Design a framework for setting
goals, policies, responsibilities and negotiation terms during the technological development
and implementation phase, from design to commercialization. (2) Because of the complexity
involved in green technological innovation, organizations demand a high degree of
interdependence to share knowledge, complementary operational capabilities and joint
action; thus creating the mechanisms to maintain these interactions is crucial. (3) A shift
from traditional energy systems requires a change of social structures and institutional
settings that demand the participation of the various stakeholders to co-produce and adopt
the technological developments. (4) The societal change that technology demands, can be
reached by mobilizing civic groups and social structures without threatening public
institutions. (5) Green technological environmental ventures can be managed through an
experimental and learning-oriented approach that enables a strategic niche management.
Learning from small systems provides basis for policy innovations that are necessary for
paving the way to sustainability as practices, such as energy consumption demand not
incremental changes but a system transformation. In brief, I consider that a system of
adaptive technology developments based on smaller operating parts within larger systems,
which have acquired valuable knowledge and experience while working cooperatively, can
contribute to a more equal and sustainable development.
Thesis Supervisor: David Laws
Title: Lecturer
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Chapter I
1. Introduction
Green technology developments bring public managers to the table with entrepreneurs
who want to promote new technologies and share regard for the public good. Green
technologies that promote the shift from traditional practices (e.g. energy consumption) to
new patterns of social behavior (e.g. sustainable energy production) demand an approach to
policy- and decision-making that reflects this character and otherwise fits the terrain. As
public managers and entrepreneurs become more deeply engaged in the discussions about
the relationship between technology and environment, they have the opportunity to learn to
manage these technological transitions.
Ventures and policies that seek to address environmental problems through
technological development face a challenge in the gap between the design phase and
implementation. Policies on implementation have too often been practiced as a "top-
down" exercise in which public management is carried out through different stages in the
policy process that can be treated as separate entities. This approach created a disconnect
between policy and action, by treating implementation as a linear and programmatic
extension of the administrative process, disregarding that programs and their contexts
interact and are subject to change. Nonetheless, this downside highlights opportunities for
policy innovation. We may ask, how do we foster those organizational connections that
would tie decision making to the changing context encountered in implementation?
Green technologies and their development are distinctive because their ultimate goal is
to further public interests. The traditional pattern of technology development has followed
the path: invention4 innovation or commercialization+ adoption or utilization. This view
of development has been expressed and encouraged by the government through policy
mechanisms'. An alternative approach to build this new development, as we move toward
sustainability, calls for a constructive approach which aims at integrating social and
environmental aspects into development from the conception phase of a technology through
subsequent stages of research, construction and planning (Remmer, 1995).
A top-down regulatory model assumes government can set technology and performance
standards to the industry that can improve practices and adopt new technologies. This can
induce technology innovation to the extent that regulated actors take steps to meet the
standard, but innovation beyond the standard will not be encouraged. Similarly, such
induced innovation through technology forcing assumes that government can control and
measure the requirements that it imposes. For example, the Massachusetts legislature
mandated that 2% of the electricity of should come from renewable energies by 2003. In a
conventional scenario regulators can either mandate a shift in technology by setting a
standard or private firms can be encouraged to take steps by market incentives (e.g. taxes or
fees). Establishing such mandates without understanding their implications or examining
the organizational structures necessary to achieve them can foster opposition and distrust
among the actors who are affected and whose participation is necessary to meet the policy
I There are technology forcing regulations and market-based incentives for technology innovation. The
former includes technological and performance standards which usually operate at the firm level. The latter
refers to policy instruments such as subsidies, taxes, fees, tradable permits and information programs. These
can motivate both firms and individuals to carry out processes or adopt products that will control pollution
that while favoring their interests and those that meet collective goals. Stavins et al (2002) argues that market
incentives are a more cost-effective way to promote technology innovation and diffusion rather than traditional
command-and-control standards. Moreover, these mechanisms can influence the rate of diffusion of
technological change.
goals. This conventional approach can unintentionally undercut opportunities for social
learning by distrusting the interaction among businesses, governments and third parties.
Under this approach the authoritative role of the policymaker is regarded as that who knows
best, in which he doubts the validity of (public) input (Shindler, B. and Cheek, K, 1999).
Additionally, this model focuses on the end of policy rather than the processes through
which policy is created or on the opportunities to create organizational incentives and
distribute management responsibilities (Laws et al, 2001).
Another problem with the conventional model of policy design is that it presupposes the
ability to foresee contingencies. It is challenging for any individual actor to control all
information, make decisions about what actions to take, and monitor ongoing progress.
The difficulties public agencies experience in meeting these demands call for a better
understanding of the interactive character of policy process: "[Flor one to 'understand' one,
an analyst seemingly has to understand the mechanics of all" (deLeon, 2000). In this vein,
the limits on government's ability to gather the information and knowledge required to make
this policy effective and accountable weakens the development of green technology and
innovation. Instead, public managers and private actors might find in this experience new
opportunities by looking at each other's sphere from the outside but also by considering
partnerships2 and other ways of organizing interaction that could facilitate technological
transitions toward sustainability. This would avoid the trap of trying to perform individually
and then being unable to control all the knowledge and resources necessary to direct the
process of technological development (Susskind and Laws, 1999).
1.1 Objective
The main goal of this thesis is to contribute to the emerging understanding of a distinct
stage in the development of green technologies. This emerging stage goes beyond the focus
of government and markets to introduce technologies that protect our ecosystems and
diminish the environmental impacts of human activities. In contrast to regulatory and
2 Definition of Partnership: The relationship between two or more individuals, groups, or organizations who
band together to satisfy a shared goal that cannot be achieved singly. This association is characterized by joint
membership rights, by democratic participation, and by shared responsibility (Poole, 1995).
market instruments (e.g. standards, fees, taxes), the actual understanding of this stage
evidences how the technological breakthrough demands interaction and high levels of
coordination across social institutions and organizational structures. Institutions and
managers need to create the necessary formal systems to control those interactions so that
the established institutions are not threatened. For instance, new institutional arrangements
emerge from the initial the invention phase to commercialization as firms, public managers
and civic groups start looking outside of their own domain for resources and capabilities that
they do not have expertise in when implementing green technologies (Starik and Heuer,
2002).
Because of the complexity that green technologies present due to the disruptions and
uncertainties they may cause within established systems i.e. firms, agencies, adopters,
regulations, the 'breakthrough' stage demands a change in the traditional progression from
policy mandate to policy adoption. I recognize (1) that green technological breakthroughs
are not only determined by the conventional path from technology development to
commercialization and (2) that technology innovation does not only come from the
traditional players - government and private actors. This stage involves a distinctive pattern
of interaction among three organizational spheres - public, private and third sector'. In
brief, in between invention and diffusion sits an innovation phase that is relatively unknown,
especially compared to the R&D and diffusion stages that have dominated the attention of
government programs (Norberg, 1999).
There is some evidence that policy makers and researchers have begun to respond to
these opportunities. As continuous research partnerships carry out studies and
development of new energy technologies, new notions suggest how incentives can effectively
move developments from a "pre-competitive" stage of product demonstration when
understanding additional factors that determine the rate of adoption of these green
technologies (NRC, 1999). However, the challenge remains in the middle ground in
understanding the institutional requirements for bringing those green technologies from the
'pre-competitive' phase to a competitive one. Because green technologies such as wind and
3 I refer to the term 'third sector' as civic groups including NGOs, community organizations, etc.
solar systems imply shifts in our current systems, social groups need to be engaged in
experimental phases and public, private and civic actors must engage one another to make
these transitions viable and sustainable.
But how are we to learn from this new developmental stage? Perhaps because the
broader implications of previous experience with policy implementation have been
disregarded,4 the systems and institutions that could review, evaluate, and monitor the
outcomes of the policy or project have not yet emerged. Scholars such as Michael Lipsky
(1980) and Benny Hjern (1982) proposed that street level bureaucrats were the key to
successful implementation and the top downers ignored that at their peril. Lipsky and
others argued that implementation occurred when those primarily affected were actively
involved in the planning and execution of these programs (de Leon, P. & L., 2002). This
calls for learning systems and attitudes located at the various organizational levels and
structures involved in policy design and implementation that will help to systematically
review the policy processes, learn from it and incorporate the new knowledge into the cycle
of policy-making.
A learning process for innovation and sustainability
Technological change is intrinsic to environmental problems. Because of the public
value that green technologies provide, they are likely to remain a core topic in the transition
to sustainability. Traditionally, the government through regulation and R&D funding has
encouraged the development of innovative technologies. Markets, when finding beneficial
incentives, may offer the most efficient way to translate the knowledge created through
research into products. However, markets do not always yield the most desirable outcomes
and processes in the allocation of public goods and resolution of social problems. As we
navigate toward sustainability, technological development moves from a one way production
stage to a co-production or co-evolution (Weaver, 2000) phase where responsibilities are
shared5.
4 deLeon, P. and deLeon, L. call for the renaissance of policy implementation their paper "What Ever
Happened to Policy Implementation? An Alternative Approach.
5 According to the framework of Technology Assessment, "this feature has not been considered systematically
in assessment activities and policy making" (Rip et al., 1995).
Green technological developments can provide lessons for innovation both to public
managers and entrepreneurs. I consider that policy does not stop when the development of
the technologies are achieved. Technological developments require more than simple
mandates. The patterns that evolve around the adoption of green technologies are
themselves best understood in terms of the kind of continuous learning and change
processes that allow for new knowledge to be produced. Like most innovations they are
fundamentally social, arising in interaction and involving reciprocal interdependence
(Tushman, M and O'Reilly, C., 1997).
My interest in the type of interactions that emerge around green technological
development is concentrated on the way in which entrepreneurs and public administrators
handle the innovation process. For leaders and managers to be able to leverage this
substance within organizations it is important to understand how and where it takes place,
and how they can foster it. Innovation emerges from learning, and the capability that an
organization has to learn depends on the kind of systems those managers and entrepreneurs
put in place in order to achieve this learning. Both formal and informal linkages contribute
to innovatory performance by providing access to new skills, knowledge, information and
technological capacity (Jones et al, 2001). In other words, I am attempting to better
understand the process by which green technologies can be brought to the ground more
effectively.
The problem in question must also be understood within the transition toward
sustainability. In the shift to a more sustainable development, I believe that managers and
policy makers as well as organizations should be prepared to respond to the challenges that
arise from multi-sectoral and inter-relationships in dealing with environmental challenges.
"Multistakeholder partnerships can be a powerful force for change and vital tool for
developing efficient and equitable solutions to sustainable development. They can offer a
sense of common purpose and a compelling vision" (UNEP). Furthermore, this demand to
build effective political alliances and learning for policy change, will become increasingly
relevant in the environmental agenda as we move from a rational environmental
management into the wider field of sustainability (Osborn, 1997).
A recent report by the National Research Council (1999) on sustainable development
notes that most of the major innovations that contribute to sustainability have occurred in
the realm of policies and institutions. There has been much less success in fostering
technological innovations that address the challenge. Hence, this creates the need to
reengage the technology community as a committed partner in the effort to navigate toward
sustainable development.
1.2 The What? My Proposal and Research Question
Much debate on the relationship between environmental policy and technological
innovation focuses on two policy instruments: technology standards and market incentives.
My hunch is that there is an entrepreneurial phase that suggests a model of learning-oriented
policy programs in which the interactions among different social actors create opportunities
for 'green' policy innovation and organizational learning. I hope to show that systematic
examination of this phase can extend our grasp of policy processes beyond command-and-
control and market incentives. The effort to bring green technologies to the ground,
however, demands the participation of a network of actors who define policy and take action
in an integrated process. This suggests there are more stages that need to be understood in
the policy process.
These stages emerge from the dynamics of interaction among diverse organizations in
the three spheres that I refer throughout the entire thesis: public, private and third actors.
Within these interactions knowledge from the bottom--"the knowledge of a local
community; of a technician" is often mobilized. Dennis Smith of the U.S. Department of
Energy reflected on the importance of this process:6
6 Telephone Interview with Mr. Dennis Smith from the U.S. Department of Energy. Interviewer David
Laws. May, 2003.
"It's not very unusualfor engineers to design the greatest thing in the world but thenyou
find that's nearly impossible to get to this part blocks to change something once they have
been installed on a vehicle. But that's whereyou immediately start getting the feedback,
and in fact get some good suggestions for early product improvements and enhancements,
it'sfrom the maintenance managers of these places, they can tellyou real quick,you know
ifyou put this on the left side instead of the right side it makes a lot easier or, Gee we
wish that you know that it could be six inches shorter or something along those lines.
When in fact a lot of people like to think that it's the best design for a blank sheet of
paper, but when it gets to the real worldyou know, you wishyou knew how big the box
should have been to begin with."
This entrepreneurial phase is best characterized as an inter-organizational process, which
is not thoroughly consolidated, however. My research explores the patterns and outcomes
that emerge in these cross-sectoral collaborations, both of which suggest a new approach for
policy- and decision-making. As illustrated below, I look particularly at the role of public-
private and third sector partnerships in shaping policies and technology innovation. In this
context innovation must be seen both as an outcome and a process that derives from the
application of the knowledge embedded in the organizations and the knowledge co-
produced as interactions among players in this 'policy network' are sustained. Moreover,
innovation extends to and depends on the transformation of organizational capabilities
(Starik and Heur, 2002). Thus, the outcomes that emerge from this phase offer bases for
policy innovation and environmental management.
Figure 1. This diagram shows the interplay of the three spheres I refer to throughout my thesis
To embark in the thesis, the main question of the research is:
"How do interactions among public, private and civic organizations including
government agencies, community groups, non-profit organizations, private firms,
trade associations, unions, create networks that shape the development and
implementation of green technologies to act upon sustainability challenges? These
interactions, which are a source of innovation, are determined by both formal and informal
patterns that promote (1) mechanisms that create and maintain dialogue (2) sharing of
knowledge and search for resources to build new skills and operational capacity, (3)
technological problem-solving, (4) mobilization of social structures, and (5) organizational
learning and adaptation mechanisms for policy design. The thesis will draw these five main
aspects and make recommendations upon them.
1.3 The How
'An entrepreneurial network is an opportunio network: evey
structural hole, gap, or disconnect represents opportunities to
create value by linkingpeople"-, Wayne Bakers
The core question of the research is addressed by mapping out the networks that emerge
throughout the process from project design to implementation. By concentrating on the
developmental process of the initiative studied, I will be able to understand the early phases
of the green technological venture, which are sources of lessons for innovation.
Entrepreneurial stages are characterized by the setting of direction, experimentation,
transformation of capabilities, and realignment of goals; therefore, I argue that the
understanding of the decisions made early on can contribute to social and organizational
learning.
By focusing on the interplay of the various players that take action in green technological
ventures, I consider that an inter-organizational analysis complements the aforementioned
policy approach while provides policy and managerial tools for fostering innovation.
Because institutions provide actors of society with different levels of degree about temporal
interdependences; they affect people's behavior and support societal change (Hall & Taylor,
1996). Exploring these emerging institutional arrangements will then open a window to
explore the interdependence between technology innovation and societal change.
The diverse spectrum of challenges in environmental management shares the need for
collective responses. For example, new energy technologies and green house gas emissions
are on the agenda of most environmental managers'. My research looks at how solar
electric technologies are brought into use through emerging policy-making and analysis
processes in the area of environmentally sound technological innovation. Cooperative
Environmental Management offers an alternative model for policy- and decision-making that
begins with the recognition that policies turn on the participation of diverse stakeholders
who each have a stake on the decision making, whether as direct proponents or as future
beneficiaries. By engaging the views and resources of these actors, those responsible for
developing policy can better respond to the demands of collective action. (Susskind et al,
2001). For policies are to succeed in this domain they must integrate communication and
action across conventional boundaries between private organizations and government (de
Jongh and Captain, S., 1999). Hence, the interactions and characterization of relationships
among the organizations (i.e. knowledge sharing, long-term commitments, transfer or
sharing of technology) become central topics in collective endeavors to achieve greater
7 Environmental managers refer to the State, NGOs, International Institutions, Private Sector and Civil Society
- and its different social aggregations i.e. cooperatives.
sustainability that can also help identify the circumstances that shape green environmental
ventures.
My research focuses on the development of a solar energy venture, the Solar-to-market
Initiative based in Massachusetts. By treating the creation of this venture as a dynamic
system, I hope to highlight the interrelationships among the diverse organizations and actors
that have contributed to the formation of the endeavor. I plan to explore the stages in the
development of the initiative as opportunities for policy innovation. By focusing on the
understanding of the organizational dynamics (i.e. why, when and how did they occur, which
circumstances made them effective or fail) and the relationships that are created in a venture
of this type, I propose that policy-making should learn more systematically from such
experiences. Systems thinking, for example, has demonstrated how "small, well-focused
actions can produce significant enduring improvements, if they are in the right place" (Senge,
1990). My approach to understanding this stage draws on systems thinking as networks
create a new institutional arrangement that (1) needs to be managed and (2) incorporated
into the administrative and legal framework of our policy domains. My goals is to identify
and examine such points in the processes where innovation is produced and illustrate how
public managers and entrepreneurs can enhance and manage these entrepreneurial stages of
innovation.
1.3.1 Scope of research
This thesis focuses on the developmental process of the Solar-to-market initiative, a
Massachusetts program that attempts to (1) foster solar electric panels or photovoltaic
systems (PVs) and (2) promote its industry in the region. The following characterizes the
scope of my research:
a) It is limited to the development of this initiative that has taken place since
deregulation of the electricity sector in Massachusetts in 1997.
b) Although solar electric systems are part of a larger renewable energies portfolio, I
will only focus on the implementation of solar technologies.
c) The approach of the thesis aims to learn from the development process of the
initiative by highlighting the type of partnerships, outcomes and networks that
emerged in the transition to bring these green technologies on-site. Its development
is related to the framework of the Public Entrepreneurship Networks that serves as a
basis for my analysis (Laws et al, 2001). This model incorporates (1) Patterns of
inter-organizational cooperation across private, public and civic actors, (2)
Interaction in problem centered networks, (3) a local venture with defined
organizational roles. This creates an system of interrelationships that makes them
work.
In brief, the thesis focuses on the social and organizational interaction that act upon the
technological development phase rather than on the policies that have influenced renewable
energies.
1.3.2 Methodology
This thesis is based on information from two main sources: Literature reviews,
interviews, which are the sources of the case study.
Literature review: The primary source for the case study comes from public
documents, reports and press releases that contributed to build the development of the
initiative studied. In addition, I also refer to literature on topics related to environmental
management and policy, organizational analysis and technology innovation.
Structured Interviews: I have collected information for the case studied since
November of 2002. My interviews include people from the following organizations:
Private actors: Solar Energy Business Association of New England, Zapotec, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Massachusetts Energy Consumers Alliance, Union Local 103
IBEW. Public organizations: Massachusetts Technology Collaborative, Department of
Energy, City of Newton. (Refer to Appendix A, and Appendix B).
Case study: This thesis will focus on the Solar-to-market Initiative. The criterion for
selecting this case corresponds to an environmental venture on its entrepreneurial stages in
order to find patterns of development, which provide lessons for policy and technology
management innovation. The case looks at a green technology venture that is deploying
solar electric systems as responses to concerns for maximize the public benefits from
environmental protection and improvement. In fact, the initiative is on its early
implementation stage and it presents a case for evidencing the technological transition of the
adoption of solar panels by the 'market' (e.g. homeowners, public schools). Moreover, the
Solar-to-market Initiative has been also chosen as an illustration of theory frameworks such
as Cooperative Environmental Management and Public Entrepreneurship Networks.
By systematically mapping out the developmental process of the venture I plan to:
(1) understand the story of the venture: What makes it an entrepreneurial effort? How
do entrepreneurs set goals and direction, mobilize resources and align different
systems to achieve their vision?
(2) identify the key actors: What is the nature of each of participating organizations and
how can we characterize their roles in part of a collaborative efforts to improve the
environment?
(3) analyze the type of relationships that have emerged throughout the endeavor: What
role does the search for the public good play? Where do problems emerge and how
are they reframed as the sphere of action shifts from public to private and vice versa?
Can we identify the kinds of interaction among public, and private organizations is
crucial to understand the development of the endeavor as well as to recognize the
opportunities for organizational learning and its managerial implications?
(4) find the outcomes or innovations: Can we identify how organizations have learned
and adapted to change, and examine their influence on policy?
(5) recognize what made the venture effective: Has the venture been successful? What
contributed to success? Can we identify any barriers to change and their
opportunities for shaping policy?
In sum, the underlying goal of this approach is to draw a closed loop that will enhance
the understanding of the approach to policy-making and analysis for green innovation.
1.4 Why focus on Solar Energy?
At the beginning of this century humanity faces the challenge of a transition toward a
more sustainable development. The Brundtland report states that "the concept of
sustainable development does implies limits; not absolute limits but limitations imposed by
the present state of technology and social organizations on environmental resources and by
the ability of the biosphere to absorb the effects of human activities. But technology and
social organizations can be both managed and improved to make the way for a new era of
economic growth" (WCED, 1987).
The energy sector is a critical factor in this challenge. Energy consumption and
provision concerns have increasingly become part of both regional and global politics
agendas. Climate change for instance, is a serious threat to the global environment as the
atmosphere condition is being affected by the emissions (greenhouse gasses) produced by
human activities. The energy sector is the main economic contributor of greenhouse
emissions and therefore, when thinking about the transition toward sustainability, our new
idea of development should incorporate the reduction of non-renewable sources for our
provision of energy.
In search for substitutes of fossil fuels as sources for energy production, which are high
emitters of C02 (almost a quarter of the total emissions come from non-renewable energy
sources) the use of renewable energy i.e. wind, solar is increasingly becoming a more
sustainable alternative to the production of energy for various applications, including
residential, industrial and commercial electricity. The utilization of this non-fossil resources
offer an alternative for power generation that reduces the impacts of human energy
consumption, assures a better management of our natural resources and diminishes the
dependence on non-renewable sources such as oil, coal and nuclear.
While there are many green energy technologies in the marketplace, the current stock of
technology is not sufficient to support a transition to a global sustainable energy system.
The market will tend to commercialize these technologies to an extent where they
8 The energy sector is by far the most important contributor, based on estimates by UNFCCC. World Energy
council. www.worldenergy.org. "The International Environmental Agenda" Visited on June 2003.
demonstrate short to medium-term promises for commercialization. Alternative
investments on energy-related technology development will be required as traditional R&D
will be unlikely to meet this need, and therefore, new mechanisms should be designed to
support new research for innovation. For instance, research and development activities for
the deployment of renewable energy technologies have been heavily subsidized through
government sponsored programs and tax credit incentives.
Yet, great challenges remain. The United States is the largest consumer of energy per
capita, and in total aggregation, as it consumes a quarter of the energy produced in the
world. Although new technologies have a pattern of long-term development, green
technologies pose a distinct question as they advocate for the public good. The provision
of energy from solar technologies requires a large-scale move from existing traditional
sources, to new implementation technologies such as distributed systems that impact how
traditional utilities have served modern society. Compared to energy efficiency practices
that target incremental changes, the dimension of the shift is more structural. This suggests
that the introduction and adoption of these green technologies demand a market and social
transformation: shift in current practices, processes and organizational structures from the
diverse institutions that are involved in the industry i.e. manufactures, distributors, industry,
utilities, consumers, regulators, researchers, etc.
As shown in the following graph, the expected trend of growth of renewable energies
indicates a rapid increasing pattern. Financing and costs are one of the greatest barriers to
technological transitions. Regulatory frameworks are also seen as an obstacle to the
development of these. Even though these two barriers are important to be considered
when addressing the challenges for green technology adoption, a systems framework that
incorporates how organizational systems and social structures manage the transitions can
provide alternative ways to approach the problem. This view poses the question of how
organizations and institutions will coordinate the necessary activities for this growth to be
managed effectively in search for sustainability.
9 Source: Greenpeace report: How can the US Retake the Lead and Solve Global Warming. Greenpeace
2002.
- Solar Electric Systems (eys)
Figure 2. Source: People and Connections. Global Scenarios to 2020. Shell International 2002.
1.4.1 Solar Energy in Massachusetts
Innovation that addresses public goods such as the environment comes from
government-sponsored R&D programs. Recently the literature has focused on supply-side
incentives that support activities of research and development within firms. The National
Research Council (1999) expressed that need for understanding the green technology
breakthrough: "A concerted research program on the kinds of incentives, market and
otherwise, needed to promote technological innovation for a sustainability transition (...) is
worth pursuing" and my research addresses this objective by looking at the transitional of
solar electric technologies in Massachusetts.
In the diverse spectrum of renewable energies solar energy has been investigated for
over 25 years. Photovoltaic systems (PVs) absorb solar energy to generate electricity; PVs
are essentially panels with special cells and films that transform the sun rays into energy.
These systems work very well under the weather and geographical location of Massachusetts,
and represent a great value for peak demand-days in summer days. In Massachusetts the PV
industry represents sales of more than $43 million annually with a high percentage
(approximately 80%) in the business coming from exporting activities. Additionally, the
industry provides hundreds of manufacturing, installation, and services jobs in
Massachusetts 10 Today in Massachusetts, over 50 companies are active in the
manufacturing of PV technologies, system design, finance and project development.
Since the opening of the Solar Energy Lab at MIT over 20 years ago, the PV industry has
grown steadily in New England. Applications of solar electric systems in Massachusetts
have been researched by private firms (e.g. Solar Design, Irradiance Inc.) for more than two
decades. In the early 1980s, for example, several experiments in the state of Massachusetts
were carried out in Lexington where a small facility on roofs was developed. This was
perhaps one of the models that attempted to scale up solar technologies in the region. By
then, the Massachusetts Electricity Company invested $1M USD and made copies of the
previous systems, while installed them in Gardner in a 30-house experiment supported by
the R&D department of the same utility. Today, the total installed capacity of PV systems
in Massachusetts is less than 500 kilowatts, which represents a load lower than a typical fossil
fuel power plant.
In sum, research and development of green technologies such as solar is not new; for
instance, solar technologies have been in demonstration for more than years and despite its
relatively readiness for commercialization, its introduction into use has not been as broad as
desired. This unrealized potential of green technologies may not only be a technological
problem, but the challenges are presented in the structure of social and organizational
systems (Chong, 2000).
10 Source: Massachusetts Technology Collaborative WebPage. www.masstech.org visited February 2003.
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Chap*-ter II
2. Case study: The Solar-to-market Initiative
"A lot of these green new technologies, rather than trying to hit them with a mass market approach, thy
found to be more successfful in introducing them in niche or in package weyohaetergtigredients,
the right stakeholders, the right local people that will put these partnerships together, so that ultimately the
strategy is that whenyou get a package of success thenyou go after the mass "(Dennis Smith, U. S. DO E,
2003)
Learning from the reconstruction of the studied green technology environmental venture
can contribute to the understanding of alternative policy processes. If we focus on the early
phases or breakthrough of the technological development, we may be able to understand
where innovation is produced. In organizational structures entrepreneurial stages are a
source for creativity (Grainer, 1998) and innovation; therefore, it is important to identify
these stages so that we can systematically manage and learn from them. Throughout the
case, I identify patterns in the development process and extrapolate findings and lessons that
offer tools for decision-making both for public managers and entrepreneurs. This
developmental process unfolds from early stages characterized by entrepreneurial actions
and contextual elements (e.g. inter-organizational relationships) that influence the outcomes
of the venture (e.g. installers suggest redesign in systems), which are the potential targets of
policy action and innovation. Moreover, studying a policy project all the way through its
adoption can provide lessons for alternative policy processes, from design to
implementation.
2.1 A Story from the Solar-to-market Initiative
"People want to do the right thing, they are willing to put up a solar installation,
however, they do not know how else to go about it, and it is not like you can go to the
store and buy an installation (...) I look at the Solar-to-market to be a learning
experience for everyone; that it is the beginning of how the Trust Fund is going to
encourage the development of solar electric in Massachusetts, and it is not the end It is
just 'ramping' things up, and eventually, their goal to make it a more direct effort and
again turn the installations, in my opinion, into an appliance" (David Tannozzini,
City of Newton)
Families in Massachusetts are starting to see how their electricity meter spins back while
their recent installed photovoltaic panels are generating energy. They can sell it to the
utilities and benefit from cost savings as well as contributing to a cleaner environment. This
is the case of families in Newton, which is one of the incentive-based clusters of the Solar-
to-market initiative. This endeavor is currently managed by the Massachusetts Technology
Collaborative and was initially conceived by the Solar Energy Business Association of New
England (SEBANE) whose knowledge about the solar industry and entrepreneurial
character contributed to the birth of the venture.
In April 14th of 2003, the first installation of photovoltaic systems of the program took
place on homes of Massachusetts residents. Mass Energy Consumers Alliance (Mass
Energy) set an initial goal of installing 40 PV systems that represents a load of 100KW on its
geographic cluster; these installations include residential homes, individual private and public
buildings such as schools and libraries. Mass Energy, a non-profit organization, has been
the coordinator of these first installations that the initiative is sponsoring through its grants
in the City of Newton. These last entities have had an ongoing relationship since they
worked together in the Federal program "The One Million Solar Roof Initiative"
(SolarBoston) " in 1999. The Massachusetts Technology Collaborative (MTC), manager of
the Renewable Energy Trust (RET) as mandated by the legislature, awarded the grants.
These awards are financed by the Trust whose effort to foster photovoltaic installations
through the Solar-to-market (S2M) Initiative is on its way. Since the establishment of the
Fund in 1997, families in Massachusetts have contributed to its financing through small
monthly payments on their electricity bills, and today they are starting to benefit from this
surcharge.
Homeowners in Newton, the early adopters of the solar electric panels, had first
established contact with Mass Energy representatives during outreach activities promoted by
this organization for over the last 2 years as part of their marketing and information efforts
within its cluster. Likewise, Mass Energy had both already built its networks in the area and
gained valuable experience on the field after working with the SolarBoston partnership.
After Mass Energy contacted homeowners to reconfirm their interest on the 'new
technologies', these participants like The Trueblood, had to go through the normal screening
process; they had to fill a pre-commitment form to make sure that they understood the
procedures and had a one-to-one conversation in which essential ideas about the
installations were clarified. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) also recipient
of the MTC grants, for instance, has adopted some of the mechanisms it learned from Mass
Energy thanks to the network of pioneers that the Solar-to-market initiative has fostered.
As expressed by Laxmi Rao, project manager from the initiative at MIT:
"[MIT has] borrowed the pre-commitment , the letter to the communit, (...) Mass
Energy gave me all data from their customers in Cambridge, they always help me, they
are way ahead of the curve, because they are community based, they are small (...)
Mass Energy is very flexible and nimble (...) If I have a question about the tax credit,
" This was the name of their program sponsored by the Federal Program The One Million Solar Roof initiative
instituted during the Clinton Administration
they help us; there is an ongoing communication, they also tell us when they hear about
any event, they have given MTC a lot of training materials, etc" 2
When establishing contact with homeowners, Mass Energy highlights the financial
aspects of the systems and upfront investments required to them as well as the benefits that
adopters obtain from a $1,000 tax-credit incentive set by the program. Mass Energy also
highlights details about the conditions and potential modifications to parts of the homes of
each potential adopter are also clarified as part of the procedure to set PVs on homeowner's
roofs. This review process is conjointly carried out with its partners Zapotec and Light
House Electrical that are involved in the planning and operations of the installations on-site.
After the residential candidates passed this previous test, the following procedures
developed very fluidly. Mass Energy visited their "site" and not only confirmed that the
initial information was right but also checked that they had very clear what the costs
estimates were going to be both in the short and long-run". Without the Solar-to-market
program, if a family would want a 2Kw PV system for their house, they needed to invest
more than 20,000 dollars and yet, assume the direct costs of the installations and its
corresponding coordination. Moreover, the homeowner experiences and feedback would
be lost for the broader project such as the one in question. With the incentives on place
and thanks to the Solar-to-market grant that Mass Energy coordinates, these costs can go
down to 13,000 dollars after the third year of installation or more 1. Indeed, Mass Energy as
one of the many actors involved is contributing to new social interactions with the
technologies.
Mass Energy works with Zapotec, partner and project engineer for these first
installations in Newton. The latter is given full responsibility of the "project" including the
1Interview with Laxmi Rao, Project Manager from the Department of Facilities at MIT. June 2003.4
13 Insert data about how the costs are distributed. $1,000 tax-credit as incentive, etc
14 Under a traditional scenario an individual 2K systems would cost over $20,000. Through the bulk
purchasing offered by Mass Energy the cost goes down to 16K. Combined with a grant of roughly $8,500 and
$1,000 of tax incentives, the users are saving approximately 50%. Source: Press release. Newton SUNERGY
Marks Earth Day With Solar Installation - April 23rd Open House Offered to Interested Consumers. City of
Newton, Massachusetts. Office of the Mayor.
design, installation, and maintenance and warranty issues. Zapotec, as a private contractor,
arranges the logistic to have the equipment supplied by Evergreen Solar, a private-sector
partner and experienced local manufacturer that provides the systems packages for the
installations. Evergreen Solar, also an awarded pioneer from the Initiative's grants, will
remain partner with Mass Energy for future commercial and residential installations, thus,
assuring continuity in the process. Additionally, Zapotec coordinates the labor schedules
with Light House Electrical, a private subcontractor of the Local 103 Union.
Local 103 became partner with MTC four years ago with the purpose of providing high
quality labor and training to electricians for the installations of the photovoltaic systems.
Mass Energy and Local 103 have an established partnership; thereby Mass Energy has
committed to use electricians from this union which is also part of the International
Brotherhood Electricians Worker trade. Because of the training experience and capacity
that Local 103 offers as well as Mass Energy's motivations to make the installation process
"mainstream", their partnership has worked effectively. Similarly, because of the
commitment of the former to the technological transition of solar panels, the union has been
supportive in providing information and orientation to Light House Electrical in the first
installations.
The first installations have been "experiments" for the development of the enterprise.
At this operation stage, Mass Energy, Zapotec and Ligth House Electrical have learned
practicalities that could have not been discovered otherwise. Technicians have discovered
that the area and conditions of the roof are to be reviewed for proper installation of the 2Kw
system chosen. The system and its load have been standardized by manufactures based on
the economies of scale. From these first installations, though, Mass Energy has learned that
each site is unique as pointed by Leslie Grossman, project coordinator from the organization
- "ifthe want a 2Kw andyour design is 22 or 24 modules, but their home ony fits 20 modules, so what do
you do, doyou rule them out and say [to the homeowners]you can't do it"5 . In the installation process,
workers have also learned that details about the conditions of the roof are important for a
safe and lasting installation. Mass Energy also has discovered that the labor pricing setting
1s Interview with Leslie Grossman. Massachusetts Energy Consumers Alliance. May 2003
for the installations is somewhat difficult. Finding a steady price has been challenging as a
result of the uniqueness of each site, she continues - "there is alwaysgoing to be a more challenging
roof pitch, it's harder to install panels on, and there are going to be jobs that are less convenient (...) we
don't' want to be paying too much because someone's installation was tricky". This learning has
contributed with practical feedback to the redesign of operational and logistical processes.
Additionally, homeowners that have adopted the technologies can now rely on a safe
system when feeding electricity back to NStar. The private utility has increasingly worked
proactively in order to facilitate the interconnection process, which has been traditionally a
persistent barrier in distributed generation systems. Because the Solar-to-market is
contributing to the increase on the demand of solar electric systems, the reviewing process
for a reliable functionality (i.e. meters going back without disrupting the existing grid) has
been streamlined by NStar, which is encouraged to have a better relationship with its
customers while assuring that installations are properly tied into the grid more promptly.
All of these are outcomes of the Solar-to-market Initiative. The collaborative framework
that has made these outcomes possible is tied to a developmental process that is still in
progress. It began when the Renewable Energy Trust was structured after deregulation.
The goal of enhancing the public good by promoting generation and consumption of energy
from renewable sources arose in the context of the threats that a deregulated industry posed
to renewable energy projects. The Trust provided funds and designated MTC to manage
these resources, but this raised new questions about how to promote renewable energies
technologies and the development of the industry in a new competitive environment. The
funding programs and activities sponsored by the RET were the initial means for these
objectives. Within this frame, solar energy and its industry had a great opportunity to be
developed by supporting the development of the PV industry and PV installation programs
through the loans and clustered grants correspondingly. After the initial scheme of the
program was crafted, the task to strategically find pioneers and allocate public resources was
accomplished.
In short, the development of this case study serves as an illustration of how a new
regulatory framework as deregulation, its challenges and opportunities, were framed by a
group of actors. Overlapping goals and motivations allowed these to gather and work
together in the implementation of solar "green" technologies. The following sections
attempt to describe (1) how the various organizations involved in the initiative interacted and
built relationships that created a network (2) how the various challenges and opportunities
were framed and refrained and (3) what outcomes were produced along the process.
2.2 The Organizations Involved in the Initiative
In the development of the Solar-to-market actors from the three spheres (pubic, private
and civic organizations) come together to act upon environmental challenges. The
following are the key actors:
* Private actors:
o The Solar Energy Business Association of New England (SEBANE)
o Massachusetts Consumers Alliance (Mass Energy) a community focused non-
profit with experience in solar energy programs
o Evergreen Solar a manufacturer of solar technologies,
o Zapotec a renewable energy project manager
o NStar an electric private utility,
o Light House Electrical, technical contractors
o Local 103, a Union trade of electrical workers
o MIT, an academic institution.
. Public organizations:
o The Massachusetts Technology Collaborative (MTC)'6,
o The City of Newton,
o Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy (DTE),
16 The Massachusetts Technology Collaborative is a state's development agency for renewable energy and
the innovation economy. Based on a collaborative approach it brings together leaders form the industry,
academia and governments to advance technology-based solutions that lead to economic growth and a
cleaner environment. Source: MTC website. www.masstech.org. visited April 2003
o U.S. Department of Energy (DOE).
Civic organizations:
o Homeowners of the City of Newton,
o Citizens committees on solar energy from the municipalities
o Students from MIT
2.3 Key Actors, Those Who Are Crucial for The Public
Interest
Actors are categorized as following by setting them in a context of their role, based on
the Public Entrepreneurship Networks framework 17(1) Pioneers: those who recognize the
opportunity, and catalyze action by making commitments. (2) Public Venture Capitalists:
those who understand and embrace risk, and put together financial and human capital to
meet the project needs. (3) Superintendents: those who provide an environment in which
innovation can emerge by fostering the development of relationships that are sustained
through formal and informal networks. (4) Mediators: those who build consensus on
goals and direction, and bring problem-solving to bear on conflicts that threaten to stall or
derail the development of the venture. (5) Stewards of the common good: who focus
attention on the common good, maintain standards for responsible behavior, and facilitate
coalescence of democratic community around programs of actions (Laws et al, 2001).
2.4 Deregulation of the Electricity Sector in Massachusetts
and Institutional Transitions
To understand when, why and how the interactions among the actors took place and
resources were shared to come together in the participation the City of Newton's first
installations (one of the various clusters of the initiative) we start this account with the
deregulation of the electricity sector in Massachusetts.
1 These roles have been deliberately taken from the PEN framework in order to analyze the case.
Prior to deregulation, electricity that came from renewable resources had established a
share in the market thanks to the provisions set by the Integrated Resource Planning
programs (IRP) and the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978. In Massachusetts,
the promotion of renewable energies had been carried out through diverse subsidies, set
asides and tax incentives from federal and state governments. These instruments improved
the competitiveness of renewable energy projects vis-a-vis conventional resources like
nuclear, oil and coal by reducing the costs and risks of investing in renewable energy
projects. In addition to the financing that came from ratepayers payments, renewable
projects were financed through electricity rates with a combination of real resources
(renewable and conventional utility) and rate levels, thereby guaranteeing a revenue stream to
the renewable facilities operators. By securing revenues, the cost of capital of these projects
could decrease as well as the risks as they were shared by investors and ratepayers.
Before restructuring of the electricity sector, the main components of the industry
(generation-transmission-distribution-customer service) were bundled and provided as
monopoly services by utilities, at prices completely regulated by the DTE18. Deregulation of
the electricity sector in Massachusetts has changed the way electricity is provided to
consumers and projects are financed. In an effort to foster competition both distribution
and transmission have been separated from generation activities, and as a result, customers
can purchase generation services from entities other than traditional electric companies.
Additionally, generation of electricity is sold in the marketplace at wholesale where
generators can compete to supply electricity at prices that are not regulated while the
Department retains oversight over transmission and distribution operations.
Deregulation has made it more difficult for renewable energy projects to compete
because of their high capital costs, the difficulties associated with finding the necessary
capital (because the owners of the power plants bear all risks of the generation projects), the
loss of a guaranteed revenue streams and a captive customer market, and the uncertainty
18 Notes on Deregulation. From Electric Power Division from the Department of Telecommunications and
Energy from Massachusetts. Source:http://www.state.ma.us/dpu/restruct/competition/index.htm
associated with the new technologies". A portion of these risks can be shifted to ratepayers
through subsidy mechanisms such as long-term loans, price supports or by instituting
public/private renewable project joint ventures (Abbanat, 1997). The development of
renewable energy technology has been affected as long-term agreements to purchase power
have disappeared in the new competitive environment. Because these technologies are not
yet cost competitive, banks are not interested in providing debt financing to the kind of
small companies that have driven these developments in Massachusetts. As a result, only
the large corporations, that have demonstrated either the inclination or ability, are now able
to finance experimental projects.
Moreover, deregulation of the utility sector in Massachusetts raised questions about
who would undertake the responsibilities for research and development in renewable
energies. In a regulated industry, the Department of Energy and the utilities had shared
responsibility in developing and financing R&D of renewable energies. Before
deregulation electric companies were monolithic and had important R&D departments.
Traditionally, private utilities received grants from public agencies to develop experiments
and pilot projects on renewable energies. After deregulation of the electric utilities, the size
of those R&D were reduced; consequently, there were less responsibilities assigned the
utilities and therefore, these organizations lost incentives to innovate, research and
participate in programs that would promote the use of renewable energies.
Once deregulation became law under the Electric Restructuring Act, the Massachusetts
State Legislature created the Renewable Energy Trust Fund to take over part of the R&D
tasks that the utilities had previously performed. The Trust's overall goal has been to
maximize the benefits from renewable energy sources to the citizens of the Commonwealth
by increasing the generation and consumption of electricity from these sources and
19 Before deregulation the main barriers to distributed generation systems included both historical trends such
as the need for large central-station generation facilities, and pricing, which was set to protect the utilities sector
and discourage competition as well as investment on these technologies. After deregulation prices of
conventional sources were expected to go down, and therefore, the development of renewable energy projects
would not be cost-competitive in the new market because technologies such as wind and solar have very high
capital costs and an intermittent nature (relies on sun shine and wind blows).
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promoting the development of a viable renewable energies industry20 . In addition,
deregulation itself provided some help for renewables. Significant progress was made in
identifying and legitimizing the benefits of distributed generation systems with small
generation loads. For instance, the Electric Restructuring Act 2' adopted by the
Massachusetts Electric Company reduced the interconnection and rate barriers to small
generations . This meant that the new act simplified some of the technological constraints
for distributed generation i.e. promoting the use of inverters to interconnect with the
distribution utilities.
'The public purpose of said trustfund shall be to generate the maximum economic
and environmental benefits over time from renewable energy ratepayers of the
commonwealth through a series of initiatives which exploits the advantages of renewable
energy in a more competitive energy markeiplace by promoting the increased availability,
use, and affordability of renewable energy and by fostering the formation, growth,
expansion and retention within the commonwealth ofpreeminent clusters of renewable
energy and related enterprises, institutions, and projects, which serve the citizens of the
commonwealth'-2
In brief, the Public Venture Capital fund has the specific objectives to: (1) Shift
energy consumption in Massachusetts from conventional sources to renewable ones, (2)
20 Source: message from the MTPC (current MTC) Executive Director and Board Chairman.
21 The 1997 Restructuring Act clearly establishes that there is a "public purpose" of generating the maximum
economic and environmental benefits over time from renewable energy to the ratepayers of the
commonwealth" The following are the 'public interests' defined: (1) the development and increased used and
affordability of renewable energy resources in the commonwealth and New England regions, (2) the protection
of the environment and the health of the citizens of the commonwealth through the prevention, mitigation,
and alleviation of the adverse pollution effects associated with certain electricity generation facilities; (3) the
delivery to all consumers of the commonwealth of as many benefits as possible created as a result of increased
fuel and supply diversity; (4) the creation of new employment opportunities in the commonwealth through the
development of renewable technologies; (5) the stimulation of increased public and private sector investment in,
and competitive advantage for, renewable energy and related enterprises, institutions and projects in the
commonwealth and New England region and (6) the stimulation of entrepreneurial activities in these related
enterprises, institutions and projects.
22 Source: Initial comments of the solar energy business association of New England presented to the
Department of Telecommunications and Energy as part of its Notice of Inquiry into distributed generation.
June, 2002)
Source: 1997 Legislation. St. 1997, c.164c 37, an emergency act, approved November 25, 1997, replaced
section 18 of chapter 25 with three new sections, including a new section 20
Increase the installed capacity of Renewable Energy generation while building a renewable
energy sector that will spur economic activity pertaining to the renewable energy business,
(3) Support and expand the development of a renewable energy cluster in Massachusetts.
The RET's financial situation since its conception has been sound, although the fiscal
crisis of 2002 have been a threat to the allocation of funds from the Trust to finance other
governmental commitments. By the end of year 2001 the Trust had $110M of
uncommitted funds and it expects to raise an additional $127M from the renewable
surcharge by the end of 2006. Within this timeframe, there are expected expenditures of
close to $20M to support the Trust's initiatives 24. The Trust has been funded by a
surcharge on ratepayer's electric bills in competitive serviced territories (average of roughly
50 cents monthly per household) 25, which have risen up to $202M by the end of 2002. As
stated by the 1997 legislation, MTC in consultation with the Department of
Telecommunications and Energy26, the Division of Energy Resources and its advisory
committee which would "review the adequacy of the monies generated by [the] mandatory
charge" 27
The Massachusetts Technology Collaborative, a quasi-public agency and the state's
development agency for renewable energy, was given the responsibility for managing the
Trust and advancing its public goals. In its role as steward of the common good, MTC
promotes economic growth by supporting regional technology-based clusters while serving
as a public policy laboratory for technology-related initiatives. To achieve its mission MTC
has organized a collaborative process by providing financial support, sponsoring research
24 Source: The Renewable Energy Trust Fund: Progress, Challenges and Opportunities. This report was
presented by MTC on February 2002, as required by Chapter 25 of the General Laws of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts
25 Source: cleanenergyfunds.org/ Press release. Funding Opportunities. Renewable Energy Trust will utilize
$1 00M from State Fund
26 On May 2002, The RET issued its own request for information regarding the use of distributed renewable
energy generation, to reduce problems associated with transmission and distribution system constraints in MA.
Given the consensus support for the installation of distributed renewables, the Trust may allocate up to
10,000,000 to support deployment of clean distributed resources in a ways that would diversify the supply of
energy resources to MA ratepayers" Source: DTE. June 13,2002. Investigation by the Department of
Telecommunications and Energy on its own Motion into Distributed Generation.
27 Source: 1997 Legislation. St. 1997, c.164c 37, an emergency act, approved November 25, 1997, replaced
section 18 of chapter 25 with three new sections, including a new section 20
and analysis of best practices, and creating momentum to address crucial issues about the
advancement of renewable energies and technologies. One of MTC's strategies to promote
these objectives is to leverage grants and loans for renewable energy projects. This plan is
complemented by information diffusion activities through studies, seminars and conferences
that appeal to the various stakeholders. Another way that MTC encourages installation of
PV systems in Massachusetts is by supporting the development of the Massachusetts
Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard.
During the transition from regulated utilities to deregulation, the change of roles and
responsibilities represented a challenge to the tasks of knowledge transfer, and the sharing of
experience and organizational capability that had been built among utilities and government
agencies during previous years. With the new horizon ahead, the new electricity sector had
to develop strategies to enter into a competitive market. Moreover, the RET had been
created not only to provide funding but also to influence decisions from the renewable
energy community and implicitly, the direction of the industry. Consequently, for the
definition of the funding programs and activities, Arthur D. Little (ADL) and Bain &
Company (B&Co.) were brought on board in order to help the find out where the industry
was, where should it go and what kind of investments and financing mechanisms would be
necessary to push the development of renewable energy market in the region. ADL and
B&Co assessed the current renewable energy sources, technologies and markets and MTC
complemented these studies with independent analyses on the status and prospects of
photovoltaic systems in the region.
After working with the previous private partners, MTC conceived a series of strategic
programs to achieve the aforementioned goals that would emphasize not only in incremental
changes but in a market transformation. These include: (1) The Green schools and green
buildings, (2) The Power Distributed Generation, and the (3) Renewable Energy generation
for Green Power. The first seeks to stimulate the construction of buildings that have a
lower impact on the environment such as energy efficiency appliances, non-toxic and
recyclable materials, and the use of renewable energy systems for their provision of energy.
The second promotes the use of distributed renewable energy generation technologies in
Massachusetts, and carries out regulatory and business assessments of the barriers that these
systems face in the Commonwealth. The third includes the new electric generation projects
that produce power from renewable energy resources, wind, biomass, landfill gas and
photovoltaic technology for delivery into to the New England distribution grid. The Solar-
to-market Initiative, the focus of this case, is a subprogram of the latter that attempts to
support distributed generation technologies and applications. All of these programs are
under development and have gone through a range of pilot projects, solicitation procedures
and loan approvals. Additionally, RET's funding activities awarded a grant to the Solar
Energy Business Association of New England (SEBANE) to support the operations of the
industry aggregation and their involvement regulatory proceedings and finally, in the
development of the Initiative.
In March of 1998, the Shea Lawsuit2" challenged the constitutionality of two charges
which fund the Renewable Energy Trust. The lawsuit claimed illegitimate the way the Trust
funds had been raised lacked consideration of distributional equity criteria because it was
benefiting areas that had not paid the surcharge. Consequently, the claim delayed the
process of the Initiative as research and development activities for the program were
essentially stalled. Although the legal challenge was favorably resolvedwo years were lost as
meetings; proceedings and the realization of partnerships were postponed due to
uncertainty. Finally, the lawsuit created uncertainty among the organizations interested in
the Initiative in respect to how the surcharge was designed. As Dr. Kern, from SEBANE
expressed: 'This was the result of a market failure: why if eveyone benefits from cleaner air, by having
REs, why should everyone not pay for it? -this was the constant question that opposing parties had to cope
with "0.
28 The core of the Shea lawsuit derived from the system-benefit charge that the Trust was carrying out to raise
its funds from users in order to finance renewable energies development. Fees from users were collected in
their monthly payments, and the small charge (50cents per month) was going toward the Trust. These fees
accrued only to the customers that were served by investors-owned utilities such as MassElectric and these
accounted for 85% of the total state. The legislation that mandated the collection of these fees did not pertain
to the municipalities regimes, which accounted for the other 15% of the total State energy generation. This
meant that the residents from these areas would enjoy clean air without having to pay for it. In the case of
Massachusetts, 10% of the municipal utilities buy energy from Massachusetts's producers and then distribute
the electricity without giving any money to the Trust
29 Personal Interview with Dr. Kern. November 2002
2.5 Crafting and Managing the Environmental Venture
"Collaboration with all stakeholders is essential to ensure the success of renewable energy
programs, given the complexity of issues and the evolving nature of energy markets in
Massachusetts and elsewhere (..) The task of stimulating the supply of and power from
renewable energy sources callsfor creativiy and experimentation"30
The Solar-to-Market Initiative is a Massachusetts-based solar energy distribution
program currently managed by the Massachusetts Technology Collaborative. The initiative
has two main objectives: (1) to encourage the installation of PV systems in Massachusetts
and (2) to promote the Business Development of the PV industry in the region. The
program addresses some of the challenges that emerge from the deployment of solar
technologies (e.g. high costs, economies of scale, regulatory barriers, diffusion, and labor
capacity) at the same time it aims to transform patterns of energy production and
consumption by consolidating distributed generation systems across the State. The
Initiative is contributing to the creation of a solar energy market in the region through
distributed systems and incentives-based clusters that enable consumers to adopt these
technologies at 'subsidized' prices. The venture is financially supported by a $10 million
fund that comes from the Renewable Energy Trust. MTC is in charge of releasing the
solicitations that invite grant proposals for up to $525,000 per project for turnkey
development in strategic geographic cluster areas that are served by the investor-owned
electric distribution utilities". Additionally, the program has fostered new job and labor
training opportunities. In sum, it is helping achieve the goals established by the Trust.
The Solar-to-market was initially conceived by the pioneers from the Solar Energy
Business Association of New England (SEBANE). In the beginning, this organization was
conformed by a group of advocates that had started out in the mid 80s as the local chapter
30 Source: The Renewable Energy Trust Fund: Progress, Challenges and Opportunities. This report was
presented by MTC on February 2002, as required by Chapter 25 of the General Laws of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts.
31 Source: Appendix A. Program Description. In; Comments of the Massachusetts Collaborative Renewable
Energy Trust. August, 2002.
of the National Solar Energy Industry Association (NE-SEIA) and had come together
thanks to their interests in renewable energies. After SEBANE had officially undertaken
the responsibilities of the NE-SEIA, it was able to legitimize its initial objectives to
consolidate the solar industry and its correspondent market. The initial goal of the
conglomerate was to grow the solar industry while making solar technologies available to the
public, and with this in mind, approached the recently created Renewable Energy Trust
managed by MTC. SEBANE's main motivation to join MTC on the effort was driven by
the 'access-to-capital' factor.
"SEBANE wanted to grow its businesses and create a market, and therefore saw the right
opportunity in the recent created Fund. Essentially we looked for MTC because we wanted
their money, we wanted to grow our businesses and that was the way to do it"" - expressed
Dr. Kern.
MTC on its role of mediator, as administrator of the RET and its programs, set a
collaborative framework that was aligned with the principles and operations defined in the
Statement of Strategic Direction". This consensus building approach unfolded in a two-
way conversation, whereby MTC held separate meetings with the industry players (mainly
SEBANE members) and other set of gatherings with all the stakeholders. Likewise, the
Trust envisioned management practices that would foster learning-by-doing practices since
there is not sufficient knowledge accumulated about the operability of the renewable energy
electricity markets in the region.
Initially, in October of 1998 and as part of the collaborative process,SEBANE, led by
Dr. Edward Kern, an experienced engineer and entrepreneur in the solar industry, and MTC
met to discuss public issues and programs that would support the solar-electric market
development after the industry restructuring". The main topics of the discussion revolved
around three main concepts: (1) Knowledge: what did these institutions know about the PV
3 Personal Interview with Professor Edward Kern. April, 2003.
33 The Statement of Strategic Direction instituted the framework for the RET's policies, procedures and
operation. It was approved by the MTC Board on November of 2000.
34 Source: Document provided by Dr. Kern, President of SEBANE. January, 2003.
marketplace? (2) Particpation: what was needed to inform and educate the public, and how
information and education could help overcome some of the barriers to technological
adoption? (3) Institutions: that will be responsible to carry out specific tasks within the frame
of the initial initiative as they had identified the need for interventions to move toward
improving energy efficiency and sustainable systems while reducing emissions from
conventional sources. On the other hand, since the beginning the Trust has faced
enormous challenges. By 1999 MTC had not yet developed a PV program due to the
lawsuit instituted; however, because of the public acknowledgment of the Fund, various
individuals and organizations submitted unsolicited requests to the Trust in order to obtain
funding, subsidies and assistance. Even though funds were available, there were no
competitive solicitations and no clear program that could support the specific technologies
that MTC needed to define.
After these requirements were set, SEBANE and MTC produced a series of program
recommendations whereby the objectives of the original initiative were defined in two areas:
(1) PV installations and (2) PV business development. At this point the participation of
SEBANE becomes highly relevant. Because MTC could not design PV programs on its
own since it lacked the necessary experience and knowledge on these technologies, on its
role of superintendent, it continued to support the collaborative approach in order to bring
the PV industry experts and consultants who assisted in the management of the process and
in drafting part of the programs." At that time, there were informal discussions and
brainstorming sessions in which MTC and the PV industry leaders agreed upon the needs
for making a successful deal for the programs. The process of shaping the initial programs
of the RET was complemented as the stakeholders meetings took place pararellaly;
meanwhile, a set of roles and tasks were set to consolidate the terms established by the
Fund.
* The Solar-to-market initiative would be a collaborative effort principally between MTC
and SEBANE, and other stakeholders to develop a set of programs that would
contribute to the growth of the solar panel industry as well as the use of PV
35 According to the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and the Clean Energy Group. Case study.
technologies. These parties included, the U.S. Department of Energy, private utilities
(Mass Electric National Grid Utility, NStar) suppliers(Evergreen Solar), non-profit
organizations with experience in the industry (Mass Energy) and representative from
Boston, Brookline, Summerville, and the City of Newton.
. The initiative required a single spokesperson who could negotiate on behalf of the
industry interests and who would concert the diverse aspects of program design and
funding in collaboration with MTC. This role was assigned to SEBANE which was
initially funded in 2001 by MTC to participate in the design process of the S2M In order
to overcome this problem the RET as superintendent set the following principles:
. MTC would provide the necessary funding to consolidate SEBANE, which on its role
of steward of the common good would provide support in breaking down regulatory and
market barriers that hinder the implementation of solar energy technologies and other
distributed generation applications in the state. Moreover, SEBANE continued to
influence the path of the initiative in its definitions. According to Dr. Kern, the
association was very direct when communicating with MTC: 'Here is what we do, and here
is what and why you should do it, and this is the way how the program should be developed and
designed" - this was the perspective of the industry association.36.
* It required a commitment to set a Venture Public Capital for the venture ($1OM).
" And a defined process of negotiation which included bringing in the Peregrine Energy
Group as a consultant and manager of the design process along with MTC. This last
group was brought in to manage the "SEBANE" project. As an industry association,
SEBANE had to be managed by a team that would represent the overall interests of the
entire industry. Initially, some organizations that were members of the association
started to lead the group; however, as tension emerged because of conflict of interests
became evident; it was sought that a third party organization should manage the day-to-
day operations of the emerging association. Since the year 2001 the Peregrine group has
been in charge of the management of the association.
The collaborative decision-making process was sponsored by the State of Massachusetts
on its role of superintendent. After the previous terms were clarified and PV industry
36 Personal interview with Dr. Edward Kern. May, 2003
leaders agreed upon these principles and the Solar-to-market Initiative was instituted.
Complementarily, other specific objectives that contribute to the transition to the
technological development emphasized the following market and social purposes:
e To promote awareness of the benefits and costs and demonstrate a feasible
development of solar technologies markets among the various customers i.e. residential,
commercial and industrial
. To demonstrate the feasibility of incorporating 'green' electricity into the existing
system and allow for the exploration of new market instruments as the State's Renewable
Portfolio Standard
In April of 2000, after the Shea Lawsuit was favorably resolved and the RET was under
full operations, MTC formulated its Strategic Direction Statement. As planned by the RET
in 2001, SEBANE initially received a grant in order to consolidate the operations of the
association including its participation in regulatory proceedings and the definition of the
Solar-to-market initiative. Dr. Kern, the actual president of SEBANE and who has led the
association for more than seven years, represented the solar industry for over six months
during the ongoing consensus building process that contributed to shape the S2M initiative.
During this period the parallel concerted process took place and a multidisciplinary working
group made up of academics, government officials, and industry leaders, among others,
gathered around brainstorming sessions. Representatives from the engineering industry,
NSTAR, Mass Electric National Grid Utility, the U.S. Department of Energy were part of
these initial stakeholders meetings. Also there were members from the solar electric industry
and municipalities of the Commonwealth like Boston, Brookline, Newton. In respect to the
consensus building meetings to shape the program Mr. Tannozzini, from the City of
Newton, expresses:
" I think that the meetings were driven, [MTC] had hired a consultant applied research
and they had done some polling of what people wanted to do, how people reacted to solar,
and they had done some research on Calfornia, and they were really tossing out their ideas
to us, to see what we thought of them. I would think that they did listen to some of our
comments, but the basic ideas were on how they were going to roll out all these solar energy
incentives for PVpanels, was really developed from the consultants they had. And that is
fine, they had done some research""
The case also demonstrates the role of the private sector in influencing policy-making.
For instance along the consensus building process, SEBANE, on its role of steward of the
common good, while working on the regulatory barriers to the development of Distributed
Generation systems expressed an ideal objective for implementing a collaborative and
experimentation framework that attempted to set a strategy by which there would be pilot
basis experiments that would highlight the opportunities of using alternative resources prior
to larger investments on infrastructure. SEBANE also made recommendations to the DTE
in regard to market incentives to encourage the development of these resources. As a
result, the consultations done by the SEBANE served as basis for the government to set
standards pertaining to regulatory issues about the operability of the future systems once
they would be in place i.e. interconnection standards, which are determinant for on-site
installations.
"[SEBANE] believes that the societal benefits of investing in these strategies strengthen the
justification for taking the time and effort to carry out several targeted pilot efforts to prove
the concept. We suggest pilot studies conducted over three to five years, in multiple service
territones, to establish Distbution System Standard Offers and evaluate market responses
to those efforts"38
MTC and SEBANE complemented their competences with studies and analysis
from the successes and failures of previous PV programs developed in other states
of the country such as California as they had documented the state of the PV
industry in the region with reports carried out. As a result, they led the design of
programs that would fit into the two areas as mentioned above: PV installation
programs and PV Business Development programs. The former includes (1) a
37 Personal Interview with Mr. David Tannozzini. May, 2003
38 This concept includes the distributed generation systems such as solar electric systems.
clustered version which creates financial incentives for the purchase and installation
of PV systems in geographically concentrated areas within the state of Massachusetts
(2) the Open Installation version which provides those financial incentives for
installation in existing buildings and (3) a production tracking system administrator
to follow up information about the production of PV and the growth of the industry
under the S2M. MTC and SEBANE, and the collaborative pool of stakeholders
conceived two main areas under the Business Development program: (1) An
industry Loan Fund for debt-financing that addresses the difficulties created by
deregulation for companies based or doing business in Massachusetts and (2) a
Training Assessment that would define the need for knowledge and technical
capacity for the PV industry i.e. installers, code officials, utilities. The latter
addresses the challenges the impacts on the workforce from the commercialization
and scaling up of a "new technology". In March 2002, the MTC Board approved
both the programs designs and the package of $10M for future PV installation
programs under solicitations released one month later.
Key to the effectiveness of the program has been the way the resources from the Public
Venture Capital are distributed. In the beginning, the funds that were available to MTC
were to be distributed 50% to the goal of supporting the industry through lending and the
other half to encourage installations by means of grants. The RET had the clear objective to
lend money to companies and support the development of the industry. However, in the
early stages, this lending was "too restrictive" in respect to the profiles of the applicants, and
MTC was very conservative during the first rounds for lending making it difficult for
applicants to be eligible39. Later in October of 2002, the first round of grants for the
clustered-photovoltaic installations was given to the awardees. These funds were distributed
geographically and covered organizations with experience in the solar energy field in addition
to the diverse profiles that each of these bring. The six initial pioneers were Mass Energy
Consumers Alliance and the Center for Ecological Innovation, non-profit organizations;
Conservation Services Group and Cape & Islands Self Reliance Corporation private
39 Based on a telephone interview with Mr. Sam Nutter Director of the Solar-to-market Initiative. February
2003
companies; the Cooperative Development Institute and the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. On the other hand, along the process of allocation of the first round of funds,
there were perceived tensions among various constituencies due to potential conflict of
interests since most of the beneficiaries from the programs were SEBANE members,
including, designers, contractors, PV-manufacturers, etc. Hence, MTC on its role of
steward of the common is continuously refining the mechanisms that advocate for
accountability and transparency.
2.6 The Solar-to-market Initiative and Its Ongoing Process
The Solar-to-market Initiative presents a great attraction to bring actors from various
sectors together, in particular those from the business sector. Because PV systems have
potential applications for residential users there was a great opportunity for expanding
experiments and businesses in the long-run in the renewable energy sector. Also, there is an
incentive for the diverse players in the initiative to come together in order to overcome
regulatory issues in respect how the electricity market behaves and how the new distributed
systems would fit into the existing infrastructure. An experimental initiative such as this
may allow testing alternatives to how new technologies or 'substitutes' can incrementally
enter in the electricity market. Because the creation of clusters of PV installations and the
implementation on them demand high collaboration among various groups, conversations
among MTC, non-profits and businesses groups have been important throughout the entire
process. By defining geographical clusters, MTC has provided the support for the logistics
in regard to the zoning of the areas that are to be targeted and the corresponding clusters by
each of the awardees so that overlapping areas of activities and coverage are avoided. On
the other hand, new pioneers, the initial awardees, have agreed on providing services in the
areas designated by MTC. These interrelationships and mechanisms for collaboration
highlight their importance in the technological transition to solar energy technologies.
Hence, not only market and regulatory barriers are the focus of technology development but
also policy design spans to the sphere of organizational analysis.
These new pioneers bring expertise in education and outreach activities; some also have
established partnerships and networks from preceding energy and solar works, and others
have expertise in project coordination and management. This is the case of Mass Energy
that had gained experience in the field of solar technologies through its partnership with the
City of Newton in the One Million Solar Roof initiative instituted under the Clinton
Administration.
"Fewyears ago, I think in 1999, and even before we became involved in the Department
of Energy's Million Solar Roof Initiative (...) Weformaly became funded by the DOE
in 1999-2000, I believe. Our partnership name then was SolarBoston and we worked
with both industy groups in the greater Boston area and solar contracting businesses as
well as communiy-based organizations that wanted to focus on clean energy and partner
with us on what we were doing for them. So we have been doing that for many years,
providing folks with information"WO
The Solar-to-market Initiative today is in the implementation phase. The previous
planning and formation phase leads us to the current and first PV installations that are taking
place in the City of Newton. Mass Energy has been in charge of implementing the first
installations recently (April 14, 2003). After obtaining a grant of half a million dollars from
the RET through MTC, Mass Energy delivered the first installation to homeowners who
were committed to the program and shared the values of the organization. The
organization had the initial goal of implementing 40 PV systems within its cluster (Boston,
Newton, Summerville and Brookline). Mass Energy joined the S2M after the initial
stakeholders meetings that contributed to the formation of the initiative. With its
experience in providing outreach and educational activities to citizens, and a built "network"
and database of people who were interested in renewable energies and PVs, Mass Energy
was highly motivated to start working in the implementation of the solar program.
"... It was the next obvious step for us, we have been promoting solar energy through
SolarBostonfor afewyears, and we have been tellingfolks about what opportunities are out
4 Telephone interview with Leslie Grossman, from Mass Energy. April 2003.
there, who to contract if they want installations.. .and if there are incentives, for us to be able
to administer a cluster of incentives, it really brings the opportunity directly to the folks that
we have been doing outreach to, all along (...) so we decide to propose to MTC that we
administer the incentives on this cluster where we already have a strong base, we have a
database for 300 lead consumers, residents, anyone that we have met at events, like the
Earth Day, who has gone to our website or heardfrom usfrom their local community
Mass Energy has built partnerships with different constituencies: community groups in
Boston, unions, local governments and business players. As coordinator and pioneer of the
first installations, Mass Energy has been aware that its strength in building partnerships was
crucial when joining MTC. Although Mass Energy is not a solar company, its experience in
the industry allowed it to propose an approach whereby its ability to aggregate would be the
pivotal factor to demonstrate how costs can be reduced by pooling the homeowners who
plan to install small 2Kw systems to get the benefits of the bigger 100Kw systems group; and
therefore, provided bulk pricing from equipment, installation, and initial maintenance. Mass
Energy is fundamental for coordinating activities in the implementation of the Initiative as it
deals with suppliers, installers, electricians, union workers, and customers. For instance,
Mass Energy has already established new partnerships with the union electricians such as
Local 103, who works with contractors from the private company Light House Electrical
whose electrician are members of the union IBEW (International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers) Local 103. Furthermore, key to the process has been both the motivation of the
union members to learn as part of their trade and their commitment to solar electric
technologies. Evergreen Solar, a Massachusetts-based manufacturer of PVs is also a vital
partner in the Solar-to-market initiative as it is currently supplying the systems for the
installations in Newton and MIT. Zapotec Energy, the project engineer that does the
consulting for the design, is also part of the expansive network of the S2M initiative and is
also responsible for the liabilities, warranties and installations. In sum, the outcomes of
these interactions reveal a collaborative approach to technological transitions, as Leslie
Grossman expresses:
4 Ibid.
"I think that Amy and Jeff Trueblood are a great example of what our goal was. They
benefited from a partnership of all these organizations working together, that I doubt they
would have gotten quite that much benefit if they would have done this alone, and they just
wanted a 2Kw system on their home and then would not be part of a larger thing""
Moreover, Mass Energy in its role of steward of the common good, as a community
focused organization, is working with public organizations as part of their broad goal of
educating and raising awareness about green technologies. Boston Public Schools that also
play the role of new stewards of the common good are willing to do installations but their
biggest challenge is financial. Various groups of society such as teachers, parents are
mobilizing to raise money to bring these technologies to the ground, however.
'And working with public schools is an example where it is really going to strengthen what
we really wanted to get out of this cluster and it is a strong educational component (...) And
the idea of the program because is based on geographical clusters, there will be enough, they
will be visible, people will start to see them, talk about them, but there is nothing like
having them on a school, and having it to be part of a curriculum where students are actively
learning about it"03
Mass Energy's initial goal of having a 400Kw aggregate installation has changed, at
least today, after the third installation. Their initial experience has provided lessons and
raised questions that they could not anticipate. Mass Energy faces practical problems
dealing with appropriate areas of the roofs for installations and resolving how the planned
program can be adapted to reflect their changing understanding. Other installations may
require more time, knowledge and skills from technicians, and each installation is starting to
be unique. Accommodating the slope of the panels to the inclination of the roofs, and the
shading, are some of the issues that the organization is encountering on a day-to-day basis.
Mass Energy is learning while it systematically keeps track of the current installations and
42 Telephone interview with Leslie Grossman, from Mass Energy. April 2003
43 Telephone interview with Leslie Grossman, from Mass Energy. April 2003
shares the knowledge gained from these initial experiments with MIT, as Leslie Grossman
denotes:
'Eveyone started looking to install cookie cutter systems, the 1Kw design and the 2Kw
design, and this was all we were going to do. And we learned very quickly that it is not that
easy becauseyou have someone at this home and they want a 2Kw ystem, andyour design is
24 modules, but their home only fits 20, so what doyou do, doyou rule them out and say
they can't do it (..) We have learned that each site is unique and as much asyou want to
cookie cutter the systems, it is a prety difficult task""
Another key actor, The City of Newton, as steward of the common good, started to
work in the efforts of bringing green technologies on-site a couple of years ago before
becoming a partner in the Solar-to-market program. The City administration's interest in
the Solar-to-market initiative was tied to the Mayor's commitment to these types of
programs and visions the city as an early adopter of green technologies. Newton is also an
informed community with a progressive attitude toward the technologies thanks to
participation in previous solar energy programs. Because of the established relationship
with Mass Energy, the Mayor decided to partner with Mass Energy and thereby increase the
possibility of obtaining a grant from MTC. Mass Energy had a great track record in doing
outreach and the city committed to 5 installations out of the total in public buildings. As
expressed by Mr. David Tannozzini from the City of Newton 5, this relationship between the
City and Mass Energy has been crucial for the success of the installations.
" [Mass Energy has] provided us with the contracting services necessary for us to promote
solar energy and to develop our work plan; although they are not engineers, nor sales people,
they are aggressive in what they want to do, which is get solar installations up, they have
that mission statement. They bring this to the table more to us, as marketing and planning
44 Ibid.
45 Mr. Tannozzini is the director of the Buildings Department from the City of Newton and is in charge of the
aspects dealing with the Solar-to-market initiative and other green technologies installations that the city has
been promoting.
of efforts. What the missing link are the sales capabilities and that will be fulfilled with
the sales agent"46
The City's Solar-to-market funded program is SUNENERGY. Zapotec is Mass
Energy's project engineer and partner for leading the installations in this cluster. Because of
this linkage, Zapotec is accompanying the City in both the development of the installations
and the training of people. Because the City will do some of the installations on the city
buildings using their own staff, the Buildings Department expects that these people will take
ownership of the equipment, keep more interest and more importantly they will be able to
transfer the technology to other cities and towns. This will contribute to break down the
myth of what the technologies are as Mr. Tannozzini highlights:
"[They are] not brain surgery. But we have to overcome that barrier that people think it
is a complicated thing and it is really not (...) The most important learning experience
has been in our inspectional services department, the people that issue permits are
inspectors, and they have learned that this is not a big deal and have readily issued
permits for the installations of PVpanels"
At the operational level, the 2kWh systems are ideal for economies of scale and bulk
purchasing. When comparing the Solar-to-market with other experiences in other states
such as California, the system of economies of scale works very well specially to bring down
the costs of the technologies. Whereas in California anybody could apply to the State to
obtain an incentive, the adopter would have still to deal with the installation and contractor.
Through a cluster incentive-based program, there is a commitment from the awardees to buy
a large quantity and the user is provided with the all the installation logistics. Nonetheless, a
challenge that the PVs installations did face had to deal with the relationship with the electric
utility, NStar. Because of the S2M, the utility has been forced to deal with customers who
want to install solar electric panels on their home or building, and then tie them to the grid
and electric meters. NStar has "informally" become a partner and streamlined the process
46 Personal interview with Mr. David Tannozzini. May 2003.
as the potential for more installations and the forces the adopters and "green technologies"
market increase.
The City of Newton on its role of pioneer has also coped with tasks pertaining to
information diffusion and lessening the uncertainty that the new technologies create among
adopters. To achieve this, the City is experimenting with a new sales agent who would work
on a one-to-one basis with those interested in the installations. This new agent will visit
other potential adopters like churches, business people, colleges, etc. And he will highlight
the benefits to users: (1) fixed costs in their electricity bills as they produce part of their
electricity, (2) users will be energy dependent to some extent, (3) adopters will be doing the
'right thing', as people are concerned about a cleaner environment and issues related to
reliance on foreign oil. With the first installations on-site, the City plans to disseminate
information through a series of Solar Open House and conferences about the current status
and trends of solar energy. Additionally, the city has a 'task-force' of citizens that
contributes to the deployment of the solar systems in their community, by raising awareness
through local activities which engage and empower the residents. According to Mr.
Tannozzini:
'People want to do the right thing, they are willing to put up a solar installation,
however, they do not know how else to go about it, and it is not likeyou can go to the
store and buy an installation (...) I look at the Solar-to-market to be a learning
experience for everyone; that it is the beginning of how the Trust Fund is going to
encourage the development of solar electric in Massachusetts, and it is not the end It is
just 'ramping' things up, and eventually their goal to make it a more direct effort and
again turn the installations in my opinion into an appliance'
MTC is relying on high quality and well trained personnel in order to achieve these
installations and that is why Local 103 from the IBEW has come into play. Their state-of-
the-art facilities and curriculum for training allows them to be at the frontier to provided
contractors with electricians who have experience with solar electric technologies. MTC has
4 Personal Interview with Mr. David Tannozzini. May, 2003.
supported Local 103 with a grant to set up training material that can reach anyone who is
interested in learning and installing PVs. MTC was able to use Local 103's infrastructure
and expertise in training to assure a capacity for high technical quality in the installations.
Likewise, Local 103 has adopted an initial goal of training around 2,500 of their members in
alternative technologies within three years to create new jobs. Because Local 103 is a
member of IBEW, maintaining a place at the forefront of technological change is part of
their vision. Working as a partner with MTC, Mass Energy and Solar Design, a private
company, has also allowed Local 103 to learn about the solar business. Local 103 has
committed as an organization to diminishing the risks and damages that consumption of
energy from fuel fossils is creating both economically and environmentally. Additionally,
Local 103 is learning from the current debate about energy consumption and generation and
has taken a leadership role in making more companies and members involved in their
training activities. Thus, Local 103 has taken on a steward of the common role by
managing and transferring knowledge with the ultimate goal of contributing to the
protection of the environment, as noted by Mr. Aikens, Business Agent from Local 103:
"You know they are kind of afraid because they do not know what this is [solar electric
technologies]. We are bringing them in and showing them what is going on and we have
been meeting with contractors and we show the video to them, we show them what we do.
Once they see it and they understand it, they are more apt to do more work. And that's
what all is about. The more people that are involved, the better is going to be for
everybody (...) 'And to do that people have to get involved and have a company and look
at their home, building and say, where can I save money? (...) It's always been taken for
granted that electricity will always be there, it's time for a change. Andyou look at other
countries and there are PVs out there. Andyou look at the US and, I think in the US
people [first] want to use something and then pay for it (...) we have to start thinking the
,48
other way"
Local 103 works with its contractors such as Light House Electrical in the case of
the installations for Mass Energy's clusters i.e. the City of Newton. The members of
48 Telephone interview with Mr. Martin Aikens. May, 2003
the union are assured high quality electricians who are also engaged in teaching state
officials what the installations are about. Light House Electrical works with Mass
Energy who has agreed to work with them in their forty (40) installations, and
depending on the demand of the jobs, Local 103 will provide the necessary personnel.
The role of Local 103 is "to make it all happen by putting it together". Local 103
maintains continuous feedback and communication with MTC for instance when a
large installation will take place. The opinions and advice of the union are relevant as
they have built in knowledge that other organizations require in order to assure that
installations are done correctly and with professionals of the trade. Mr. Aikens sees
the results of this win-win situation and recognizes the relationships built through the
Solar-to-market initiative.
'Eveyone has a place in all these, everyone has their own piece of the business, and we
keep in touch all of us, MTC has everything on their website, so I can see who is getting
the grants, what kind of companies are looking to do these installations (...)I think it is
more of a partnership. MTC asks us things and we ask them too. And we go
backward andforeword."9
As a win-win situation the initiative continues its path and has arrived at MIT. MIT's
Community Solarpower Initiative is the result of the grant awarded by MTC as part of the
broader Solar-to-market program. The Institute is currently planning for the implementation
of its cluster PV installations. MIT installations will be used as pilots for demonstration,
research, and educational purposes and will contribute to the role of the institution as an
environmental steward. Additionally, MIT has developed a collaborative linkage with the
Cambridge Public Schools in order to place PV systems on public school buildings. As a
result of this partnership, high school kids can study and explore the new technologies while
building awareness of alternative sources of energy to preserve our environment. To
accomplish these foreseen activities, the academic institution is working together with
private-sector partners Conservation Services Group and Evergreen Solar. The former has a
solid experience in developing markets nationwide for environmentally friendly electric
49 Telephone interview with Mr. Martin Aikens. May 2003
systems and handling transactions related to the sales from the production of energy of to the
utilities. Evergreen Solar first technologies had been commercialized through MIT and the
institutional linkages among both organizations make them a strong partner.
'This is a tightly knit Massachusetts home team bringing together research,
development, teaching, training, manufacturing and service skills needed to complete this
collaborative initiative" 'The MIT Communit Solarpower initiative has several
educational objectives. Students will become aware of the potential of solar power. The
town will integrate this power source into their conventional systems, and gain
experience in the performance of the technology"
Through these efforts MIT continues to expand its network or partners and has started
to work with Zapotec, a player who is learning from the work with Mass Energy and the City
of Newton. In its search for more flexible systems MIT has also initiated a partnership with
other suppliers like RW Shat. Regarding the allocation of the funds from the Truste, Laxmi
Rao, considers that experiences at the operational level are demonstrating to MIT how
important adaptability and cooperative work are in the pursuit of the right partners to share
resources and achieve the public interest. This reflects that the program is still being shaped,
and the findings at the operational level offer a starting point to change. Mrs. Rao, Project
Manager at MIT, reflects:
"Its a good start, but from the design perspective its better to unbundle these grants,
because an electricity contractor may not be good at outreach, (...) some [organizations]
are better at ones things than others (...) They did things diferenty the next rounds.
They redesigned some of the procedures after listening to us" 52
MIT personnel in charge of the management of the project has learned that by
Partnering with Cambridge Public Schools and make them the "hosts" of part of its PV
installations, it will overcome difficulties associated with the physical shading obstacles that
5051 Source: MIT Community Solar Power Initiative: Responses to MTC Inquiry. August 26,2002
Source: MIT News. Grant funds solar power project on and off campus. October 24, 2002.
Interview with Mrs. Laxmi Rao from the Debarment of Facilities at MIT.
many condominiums and residential projects are subject to. This suggests that strategic
choices about these awardees i.e. the selection of organizations and communities with
advantageous networks and structures that are accountable for the people, highlight a
relevant educational component of the initiative. For instance, MIT is already experimenting
with issues about visual acceptance of solar panels, attachment methods for integration to the
built environment.
"Clearly the modelfor building awareness of environmental problems and solar energy
solutions through a university workplace is replicable (...) The use ofprivate contractors
for both the installations and back ofice infrastructure, with MIT serving as the catalyst,
would allow this cluster to take on a life as a spin-off'"
The Solar-to-market Initiative demonstrates the importance of multi-sectoral
partnerships in leading environmental challenges. Although the development
process has undergone difficulties, the expansion of the networks and the current
implementation of the clusters is both tightening the organizational linkages initially
created and mobilizing vital resources such as civic groups to work toward an
energy market transformation. Because the program is on its early phase despite
the years of research and planning, it demonstrates that public managers should not
only strive to focus on organizational processes when making decisions but also
learn from the ongoing implementation which as illustrated is a source for
innovation. MTC is presently assessing the initial results from the first installations
by maintaining meetings with stakeholders and keeping track of improvements and
suggestions made by organizations involved in the implementation so that further
installations are more effective. Finally, MTC has released a new series of grants to
increase the pool actors working on the overall Initiative.
5 Source: MIT Community Solar Power Initiative: Responses to MTC Inquiry. August 26,2002.
Chapter III
3. Case Analysis
The Solar-to-market Initiative is the beginning of a solar energy market and distributed
generation transformation that brings public, private and civic actors together to take action
upon sustainability challenges in Massachusetts. In this chapter, I introduce the framework
of Cooperative Environmental Management (mentioned in Chapter I) as a response to
present sustainable development challenges and illustrate some of its patterns, which I found
in the developmental process of the initiative. Subsequently, I break down this process
based on the Public Entrepreneurship model in order to systematically provide evidences of
the "breakthrough" stage I alluded to in the introduction. With this in mind, I will
demonstrate how actors (1) focus on problems, (2) engage in a debate, (3) co-produce
knowledge and (4) reframe the problems and set for the basis for change and innovation.
Thus, these two frameworks support an alternative approach for policy-making for green
technological innovation.
3.1 A Cooperative Green Venture
Cooperative Approach to Policy process
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Figure 1 represents a schematic approach to a Cooperative Environmental Management model
for policy analysis and policy-making.
A Cooperative Environmental Management (CEM) supports a policy approach in which
government, businesses and civic groups discuss environmental, economic and social
concerns, cooperating to resolve their differences (de Jonhgn and Captain, 1999) while
merging central competences in reciprocally underpinning ways. Moreover, this approach
sets a strategy by which society as a whole is integrated to share responsibilities to manage
the environment. By recognizing policy as a process, it allows for all parties to be
accountable working for long-term goals through a policy debate. In brief, CEM illustrates
an ongoing interaction of the three spheres rather than the government attempting to
influence others to take action.
In a cooperative environmental management model, as the one sketched above, policy is
shaped on various spheres and by various actors. Not only regulators and policymakers are
involved in the formulation of projects and programs, but also the private and the third
sector have a role in the various stages of the policy process. This model presupposes that
policy is subject to contingency, and therefore a more adaptive strategy should be adopted
by public managers when carrying out programs. The aforementioned approach opens
space for experimentation and social learning as it recognizes that policy-making processes
are generated from the interaction of organizations and social networks, while acknowledges
that this learning encourages innovation. Moreover, it sets the policy process as a
continuum, as a loop where the learning from the evaluation and implementation systems
feeds the problem setting, not only for the next policy or project, but also interactively with
the same policy in question, so that it is refrained (e.g. adaptive management - policy is
ensued, experiment is developed, results change X principle of the policy, policy can be
changed). By understanding this area and bringing this type of knowledge that emerges,
policy choices are nurtured from a bottom-up approach.
Cooperation among the diverse managers involved in the initiative correspond to: (1)
Formal arrangements that, for instance, create a legal framework in which the parties
operate, and (2) Informal arrangements by which the parties establish common goals and
share knowledge while promoting social learning and achieving accountability. Informal
patterns of interaction among diverse organizations such as structures, power and
communications in environmental ventures are fundamental for managers. The norms and
values that emerge from this, act as social control systems. These norms and values are
forces for innovation and change. Informal patterns of communication as those defined by
whom talks to whom can be defined by a map, and we can spot the key actors within an
initiative. These nodes within the networks will be likely to have more impact on
innovation and change efforts. According to the Constructive Technology Assessment
theory, membership in a network can be the most potent means of having effect on
technology (Rip et al, 1995) asinformal social networks evidence sources of power.
A Network Approach for Green Technological Development and Sustainability
Cooperation is essential for green technological development and adaptation as we
navigate toward sustainability. Networks tend to foster more innovative policies and more
effective implementation of public policies, and finally, networks can help to realize the goals
from consensus between social actors with different values, through dialogue and exchange,
as some networked pattern is a common starting place for innovation (Peterson and
O'Toole, 2001). However, issues of transparency and legitimacy, accountability,
administration and leadership emerge from these, as they will be evidenced in the case.
How do we build a system, or networks, that can cope with these concerns
aforementioned? And what does it mean to participate in such networks? Can we control
those networks or systems when they emerge informally? Can these interactions and
multigroup activities in the implementation of policies be understood as deLeon (2002)
suggest as a democratic approach to policy implementation that includes the analysis of
inter-organizational relationships for policy-making in a "renaissance' of implementation?
The interaction between businesses and governments has become increasingly
fundamental when taking action upon the environment and theory models such as Public
Entrepreneurship Networks support it. This is a model that: captures the dynamics of
change and the implications for action by diverse actors which engage in inter-organizational
relationships and who are ultimately attempting to move action towards a sustainable
development. For this model, government must participate to ensure that public
entrepreneurship networks function effectively and stay oriented to publicly endorsed goals.
Furthermore, governments should learn how to facilitate the creation of these networks in
order to enhance their impact (Laws et al 2001).
In sum, learning to manage the interactions among the three spheres (public, private and
third sector), illustrated by the policy approaches mentioned above, is a central topic in the
transition to a new model of development. The way in which decision makers at various
institutional levels (government agencies, NGOs, businesses and social entrepreneurs) go
about this, will determine in great part, progress towards the challenges for sustainable
development. Thus, in moving towards sustainability, public administrators and
entrepreneurs must focus on developing cross-sectoral and 'close loop' managerial decisions
which are inclusive, otherwise, their long-term viability would be threatened.
3.2 Structure of the Analysis
Bringing green technologies to the general public requires great coordination between
private, public and civic organizations as well as adjustments in the regulatory and market
structures. The initiative studied demonstrates the barriers and opportunities that emerge
when businesses, government agencies and civic actors interact motivated by shared goals
while taking on roles and responsibilities that need constant realignment so that the public
goals are ultimately achieved. Finally, the Solar-to-market Initiative demonstrates how the
interaction among the various organizations involved has created a network that is
continuously emerging as needs for sharing capabilities and knowledge grow. These
patterns are a source of innovation that public managers and entrepreneurs can learn to
manage in order to achieve environmental and public purposes.
As mentioned in section II, the methodology to approach the case proposes to
. To understand the story of the venture and organizational patterns of the
developmental process
* To identify the key actors involved (see Appendix 1 of chapter) and their main
goals
. And analyze the type of relationships that have emerged throughout the
development of the Initiative,
* To identify the outcomes or innovations from these interactions i.e. knowledge co-
produced, learning, policies
* To understand what made the venture effective and what can we be improved i.e.
barriers, successes
The following diagrams trace the developmental process of the ongoing Solar-to-market
Initiative. They highlight the actors and the terms in which they frame the problems that
provide the ground on which they interact, and show how these obstacles are reframed
through interactions and work toward common goals. In order to grasp and analyze the
very fluid process of interaction, I map the process as a series of discrete interactions among
the actors involved in the Initiative i.e. what actors come to act upon each problem.
Principally, these occurred when motivations, goals and interests come to question. An
actor or set of actors address the goals or problems and act upon them. Finally, the graphs
show the outcomes from each key phase of interaction, which can are both the sources for
policy innovation. The following diagram shows the entire developmental process of the
Solar-to-market Initiative. As shown in the graph, problems emerge, actors come together
to work on them; their actions produce outcomes, which then raise new problems that are
framed and reframed by permanent and incoming actors. As the policy network expands it
demonstrates that the knowledge and experience embedded in the smaller structures can
contribute to close the loops for solving initial problems.
Developmental process of the Solar-to-market Initiative
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3.3 Mapping the Developmental Process of the Solar-to-
Market Initiative
Deregulation (P1 or Problem 1) provides the point of departure for my effort to trace
the development of the Solar-to-market initiative. It framed a problem that interested a
group of actors. How renewable energies would be pursued in Massachusetts after
deregulation and the administrative reorganization that accompanied it. I refer to it as P2 (or
Problem 2) in the map attached. The question that was posed with this framing was. "How
to promote renewable energy development after deregulation?"
This problem provided a common focus of interests and a basis for discussion among
three key actors: SEBANE, State Legislature and Utilities as seen below in figure 1. The
business sector, interested in green energy, advocated for mechanisms to maintain alternative
energies competitive while continued breaking down the barriers to distributed systems such
as PVs. The State Legislature stressed the public motivations in promoting alternative
energies when mandating the creation of the RET. Private utilities needed to understand
what both competitors and industry were providing to the existing infrastructure systems i.e.
how to connect new systems to the grid. There is evidence to infer that a change in a
regulatory framework creates a type of disruption that demonstrates that public scrutiny is
needed to justify investments from public resources such as the RET. It also stresses the
need for government to (1) create and adopt mechanisms for transparent, efficient and
synchronous oversight, (2) stick to its commitment and (3) demonstrate and communicate
the public benefits expected from the investments.
MgI: These diagrams describe the development of the Solar-to-
Market initiative whose central technology are Solar Photovoltaic
panels (PVs); it is explained through the interaction of actors around
different problems.
Circles represent the problems around which
development was framed. Shaded circles
represent resolved problems.
Squares represent the actors which form
networks.
Diamonds represent the products/outcomes
which come out of the interaction among
networks.
Figure 1 (A).
While deregulation posed challenges to the development of renewable energies (P2), the
State Legislature created the Renewable Energy Trust and outlined a set of policies that
would determine the future investments of the capital raised. The actors interested in
framing this problem came to play as show in figure 2; these, included private and public
participants whose interests and knowledge about the field of renewable energies brought
them together in order to discuss possible mechanisms to finance renewables after
deregulation. In setting the mission of the RET, actors came to discuss how both the
communities and the renewable energy industry from the Commonwealth could benefit
from the portfolio of programs to promote alternative energies. In other words, the
question with this framing was "how could they meet the goals set by the RET" (P3). MTC
looked for outside resources that would provide knowledge about the industry and partnered
with private consultants who carried out research of best practices and benchmarking
studies, which served as a basis for the definition of the projected programs. This posed a
new problem thereby MTC and the stakeholders involved at this stage (e.g. SEBANE,
Municipalities, MTC, DOE) reframed the challenge "How to increase the installed capacity
and market shift to renewable energies?" SEBANE, as pioneer, particularly pushed for
focusing on breaking down the costs and regulatory barriers so that that implementation of
renewable energy technologies could be achieved more effectively. In brief, the creation of
a pool of public capital as a result of restructuring of the electricity industry triggered the
interaction among a pool of actors would eventually take on responsibility for defining the
allocation of the resources and the path of renewables. From these initial cross-sectoral
interactions we can see that organizations join efforts to complement responsibilities and
learn one from those in other "sectors" to resolve difficult environmental technology issues.
Nevertheless, at about the same time, two new challenges were derived from the
previous problem, prompting a transition. The barriers that emerged at this stage, which are
framed as P4 and P6, as shown in figure 2 bring actors together and yield collaborative
outcomes i.e. Distributed Generation Collaborative Policy. However, the Shea Lawsuit,
brought about issues of accountability as a set of stakeholders claimed the illegitimacy of the
collection of payments to fund the RET. This reinforces the need of both a clear and
strong consensus building and negotiation framework to shape and discuss the policies that
derive from the Public Venture Capital. This framework allowed integrating and bringing
together the diverse perspectives and interests in order to reframe problems and plan for
actions while defining rules and assigning responsibilities.
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Figure 2.
The focus of my analysis continues on the policies to achieve the goals to increase the
installed capacity and create a market shift to renewable energies, which summarize the goals
foreseen by the RET. To achieve these goals, the actors shown in figure 3 came into play
and engaged one another in the consensus building process managed by MTC. Because this
process established two separate series of meetings (e.g. MTC-industry, MTC - all
stakeholders) the conformation of the 'policy network' may have been affected as issues of
accountability or trust may emerge. This implies the significance when designing a
collaborative framework where all the information is presented clear to all parties and the
policy debate is acceptable to all the stakeholders.
At this stage MTC, as manager of the RET, defined a series of programs to invest and
distribute the money collected by the Trust. These policy choices were based in great
proportion on the studies and benchmarking performed by the private consultants. New
actors i.e. Municipalities, Industry Actors and Academics, joined the process both because
their interests coincided with the RET goals and their expertise could contribute to design a
strategy to increase the installed capacity and shift to a market of renewable energies. The
main outcomes from this stage were the three funding programs that would address the
research, development, and implementation of the wide portfolio of renewable energies in
Massachusetts. Hence, we can see that once a pioneer takes action and public
administrators facilitate an environment for debate, knowledge and expertise can be shared
in order to achieve commonly desired environmental goals.
The collaborative dialogue sponsored by the State Legislature through the RET, and
mediated by MTC, contributed to shape the different programs that the fund had foreseen.
However, as evidenced in the case, the consensus building process was driven by influential
actors who had more power; the two-way dialogue may have stressed this circumstance.
For example, decisions about how to craft the programs were not completely democratic as
noted by various interviewees (e.g. p.4 1). This shortcoming might have constrained
opportunities for innovation and better adoption of the programs which are noted in the
implementation phase. For example, an early idea conceived by Mr. Tannozzini was that
every municipality should have at least one installation in a public school to encourage
education, is recently being thought of by MTC. Also, MIT has advocated for including
smaller and more effective organizations to work with as part of the network; the Institute
has experienced some coordination problems with one of its partners that for instance, are
not as collaborative and effective as ideal. In brief, these weaknesses of the consensus
building are a twofold: they may be the root for perceived issues of accountability that are
brought to the table later on, but are the source of opportunities for learning.
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The Green Power Program was crafted as a way to achieve the goals of the RET. It
included the development of solar energy technologies as part of a wider portfolio of
renewable energies in Massachusetts. As shown above in figure 3, the consensus building
process maintained stakeholders engaged in the debate where information and values were
shared. These actors came together to plan a strategy that would lead to reframe the
problem in question which frames the question "How to promote Solar Electric
Technologies- PVs? (P6). SEBANE's knowledge and expertise in the field of solar
technologies as well as the lessons learned from the studies contracted by MTC, mainly
guided the other parties who agreed on the main targets to achieve this goal. MTC along
its partners crafted a two-way strategy to create a market for solar energy technologies: (1) to
foster industry development (P7) and (2) installation of solar technologies (PV systems). In
addition to the fact noted above, when the Peregrine Group was brought on board to
manage the solar association (SEBANE) its involvement was sought to avoid issues of
accountability and conflicts of interest that might emerge as members of the association
were managing it. The implication for public administrators is to consider these networks
of actors in order to balance the control and autonomy of some institutional actors in
pursuit of communal objectives.
On the other hand, though the RET and MTC did plan to promote programs to raise
awareness, evidences from the case demonstrate that other social structures are required to
be considered in order to better achieve the overall goals of the initiative. For instance,
some parties have demanded more emphasis on educational, training and outreach programs
as part of the information diffusion stage of the technologies. Thus, it is important to
consider that the focus on the technological development should not only on these two
aspects: technology and market. It requires the coordination and administration of social
and organizational structures that will support the technological development while
facilitating its route and adoption by communities. The problem that interests us in this
case raises the following question: "how to promote PV installations in Massachusetts?" and
therefore, I continue to follow this problem and subsequent developments along this track
in my analysis (P8).
The Solar-to-market program was the outcome to the question posed by P8 "how to get
PV systems installed in Massachusetts?" as experienced actors both from the public and
private sectors framed this question as shown below in figure 4. Though, as I argued above,
the principles of the program remained mainly driven by MTC and SEBANE. These last
two, along with the other stakeholders reframed the question, which became a policy-design
problem (P9) whose initial answers were drawn from consulting studies and experiences in
other states i.e. New York, California. MTC also directed the consensus building process to
elicit opportunities and solutions for the project design. The outcome of the new program
was a two-way mechanism in which the solar energy market transformation would be
achieved, and these two, the PV installation and PV industry development programs, led to
new policy choices.
Consequently, the path I continue derives from the first program whose three products
were (1) an open installation project, (2) cluster programs and (3) production tracking
systems. These outcomes demanded a set of different of skills and managerial competences
in order to jointly accomplish the underlying goals of the initiative. Additionally, these
became the focus of policy- and decision-making which demanded new organizational
capabilities to carry on further responsibilities. For example, the cluster program provided
grants to pioneering organizations with specific capabilities and expertise (e.g. training,
outreach, educational, manufacturing) and incentives for users in order to promote a market,
both supply and demand, for solar technologies. Another example illustrates how the
Cadmus Group, a private partner, is currently in charge of the Production tracking systems
thanks to its experience and capacity to manage information technology systems. These
new mechanisms will allow organizations to learn for future experiments because it provides
information that allows to feedback the design of the systems, and to choose best locations,
among other characteristics. In brief, approaching the emerging problems with a strategic
niche management approach where policy formulation and implementation could be
planned cooperatively, allows integrating the various resources needed to accomplish the
common goals more effectively.
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As shown below in figure 5, the focus of the case continues on the policies that emerged
from the grants and cluster programs. The implementation of these posed a new problem
(P10), which is reframed once again by the same actors in the process: how to implement
these programs so that it harmonizes with the goals proposed and existing organizational
structures?
In the meantime, the relationship among the parties continues to be guided by the
consensus activities directed by MTC. Furthermore, interaction around this problem
produced a stream of insights that provided the basis for policy learning and guided the
subsequent design of action. For example, experiences in California suggested that there
I=
could be alternative programs other than providing direct incentives to customers;
consequently, a cluster approach would be suitable for economies of scale otherwise not
available when grants are made directly to building owners. The leading organizations
promoted the cluster-based incentives programs, as for instance, SEBANE had always
advocated for a type of subsidies to make the technologies accessible to homeowners. The
policy choice that supported the grants had been eventually formulated once the RET was
formed; it was then realigned by MTC that set strategic decisions such as the selection of
geographic clusters to deliberately redistribute the money in knowledgeable and experienced
locations that relied on existing social and organizational structures.
The previous problem posed a new one (P11) framed by MTC and SEBANE as "How
to find pioneers that would match the strategic locations in order to create capacity?" The
six organizations awarded with the grants fulfilled these objectives and offered a diverse
portfolio of skills and resources that are presently being shared. The case suggests that the
initial pioneers were selected strategically as they could complement each others
competences. In fact, the grantees include a pool of experts in manufacturing (Evergreen
Solar), outreach (Mass Energy), educational activities and innovation (MIT). The allocation
of resources can create the type of interaction that public administrators and entrepreneurs
can manage to maintain the dynamics that seek that advocate for the public good. In this
entrepreneurial phase, organizations make commitments, set new strategies and mobilize
resources while aligning their internal systems to focus on the collective tasks of the
endeavor. For instance, although Mass Energy had experience in Cambridge, it committed
to share its knowledge with MIT while enhancing the initiative's ultimate goal of having an
educational steward leading the installations. Moreover, Mass Energy proposed to
administer the incentives on a cluster where they customer database and social capital was
quite significant.
Creating capacity then became a new problem (P12) that was framed by MTC as " How
to find and train electricians for the installations?". The interactions among MTC and the
Union Local 103 address this 'human capital factor' necessary to install the solar electric
systems on roofs. Having established an early partnership with a union that had already
personnel with knowledge about the green technologies and providing it with a grant in
order to instruct interested electricians by promoting training packages, MTC strategically
was going to offer high quality workers for the program. By taking advantage of an existing
curriculum, state-of-the-art infrastructure and good will (that of LBEW), MTC addressed a
fundamental social factor, often disregarded in technological developments: the human
factor. However, the timing and planning of labor capacity was not completely well-
managed; for instance, there is presently lack of a trained workforce for the amount of
installations required. For public managers and entrepreneurs, this highlights the need for
adopting policies that take into account the capacity-building question early during the policy
design stage.
Other instances demonstrated that Local 103 could take on further responsibilities other
than providing a workforce. The case demonstrates that as the unions becomes more
engaged in the debate of green energies, it assumes a new role that can reinforce not only the
objectives set by the program but additional societal goals i.e. educating others, leading
change, promoting a role model. This implies that managers could assign multiple roles to
certain groups, and empower them with further responsibilities to promote change and
innovation. In sum, these grants are creating a pool of networks, which demands more
complexes levels of coordination among organizations, at the same it requires that policy
choices not only address the regulatory and market concerns about the new technology but
also human and social factors i.e. labor, training, education, and communication.
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As outlined below in figure 6 MTC screened the new pioneers, a new problem was
posed and framed by the question "How to distribute the funds among clusters? (P14).
This problem triggers further choices in order to assure that public goals are visible. For
instance, the question yielded three main targets: Public schools (potential forums for
education, research, and developing new curricula), residential users and visible (public)
places. These three choices correspond to obvious users, but along the process, MTC, MIT
and Mass Energy, for example, have identified the importance of partnering with more
public institutions as an effective way to educate communities and replicate the systems.
Additionally, operation activities for each of these users, although seem similar, have
demonstrated to demand targeted choices in regard to the design of the systems, the
purchasing of equipment, and the procedures to deal with the renewable credits obtained
from generation. It is different to sell homeowners electricity to the utility than selling it
from a public building. The designs of the systems are different as loads, labor and time
differ. So how do organizations go about this? At first, the pioneers and their partners are
learning from the initial installations and interactions with the community. As the dialogue
with MTC is maintained, changes to the way the packages were conceived are being made.
Also, pioneers have expanded their networks as new problems emerge in this
implementation phase so that they can respond and adapt to additional demands. These
responses distinguish a particular social interaction between technology and adopter
highlighted by a niche target.
Moreover, the distribution of the funds at this stage raises the question of
accountability as the initial geographic clusters may be seen as favored by the program;
therefore, this process requires a transparent process for debate and negotiation as people
are expecting results from the money collected for the Trust in order to promote green
technologies. Would it be better to unbundled the grants in a way smaller organizations can
fill in structural holes that materialize in the implementation phase? Thus, public managers
and entrepreneurs would organize policies that are flexible and responsive to these changes.
MTC had faced the challenge of finding the right places to allocate the funds and
promote solar technologies. This problem was framed by the question "how to install the
panels in specific locations and bring actors who are experienced at the operational level"
(P13). As mentioned before, Mass Energy, an experienced organization with close ties and
a track record working in the City of Newton, received one of the grants awarded by MTC.
Thus, this posed a new problem to Mass Energy coordinator of this cluster, which framed it
as "How to install PVs in Newton?" (I concentrate my analysis on this cluster as it has been
the first to have installations). The implementation chain - a network of suppliers,
manufacturers, distributors, project managers, grid experts, unions, contractors, technicians
- comes into play at this stage. The interaction among themselves as well as with top actors
like MTC and SEBANE has resulted in outcomes that are basis for policy innovation. For
example, the way that citizens from the City of Newton have organized themselves as a task-
force to participate in the technological development demonstrates the type of environments
that can enhance relationships among different constituencies. The Solar Open House
organized by the City administration has reinforced the type of setting that fosters informal
ties appropriately for society to learn about new technologies. Moreover, new problems are
refrained by new participants in the network; for instance, Zapotec addresses the question
about "How to manage a project, liabilities, warranties and issues with suppliers" (P15a).
On the other hand, NStar implemented their process to allow meters to spin back to the
grid, an issue that had been worked since the beginning of the RET. However, it was the
cooperation with the City of Newton and the social forces of the citizens that pushed this to
happen. Another illustration is given by the fact that installers and project managers are
learning that each site is unique (Mass Energy and MIT) and it requires that the equipment
may be designed for various type of locations and not only as standard modules as planned
initially. Simultaneously, the flexible character of technological design comes about as
experimentation may provide the basis for changes and adjustments. These actors posed a
new problem which is framed by the question "How to learn from the experiences?"(P 15b)
Although systems are being manufactured to benefit from economies of scale, the
implementation of the program needs for the creation of infrastructures that allow more
efficient and flexible companies to enter the network. This is the case of MIT that has
expanded its network and has partnered with Zapotec, a smaller organization in order to
provide services more effectively. MIT is now partnering with a company that produces a
more diverse range of panels so that they can be accommodated for the specificities of the
various locations. MIT has also capitalized from the organizations that came together in the
Solar-to-market effort; MIT is planning and carrying out the procedures for its installations
based on the learning from Mass Energy, while establishing an informal relationship that
supports it.
These examples suggest that a niche management strategy for the deployment of green
technologies appears as an alternative pattern in the technological development. The
detailed information managed by consumers, users, installers, and community-based
organization serves as a foundation for feeding back the redesign and realignment of policy
decisions. The knowledge co-produced at this stage and the initial learning on these early
phases, can determine effective changes to the program.
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Figuire 7 (below) shows that the expansive network created by the Public Venture Capital
starts sharing resources as overlapping interests maintain actors working together. For
example, Mass Energy's cluster and MIT cluster are sharing information about how to deal
with the contracting procedures with homeowners, outreach strategies and materials, and
operations information. Because Mass Energy has been the first pioneer, the networking
among these clusters has allowed MIT to expand its network of suppliers. As MIT needed
to keep up with some competences, Mass Energy referred Zapotec to MIT. Similarly, MIT
brings unique resources to the endeavor. For instance, the Institute is presently developing
the "Solar Rover", an experimental tool that will serve to investigate the performance, visual
acceptance and attachment methods for integration into MIT's built environment. As the
initiative and the inter-organizational dialogue continue, the results and infrastructure that
the Institute can provide will be used for more effective installations in other clusters. In
brief, both informal and formal organizational ties are creating responses to problems and
opportunities for experimentation, fostering learing and change, as well as contributing to
the implementation of the program.
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Appendix 1.
The following summarizes the key relationships I highlight from the case
Key Relationships throughout the development process
RET @ creates a focus of capital to be distributed among a network of actors, and initial public ideas
RET-MTC @ manages the public venture capital for action
SEBANE-MTC @ experience, knowledge + institutional credibility, capacity, financial,
MTC +SEBANE + other stakeholders @ share knowledge, shape programs, "joint" policy design,
bring issues,
MTC- Awardees (@ set rules, commitments and agreements, logistics, define and assign clusters
Mass Energy - MTC (@ agrees, takes action, mobilizes resources toward goal
City of Newton - Mass Energy @ mobilizing community towards the goal
Mass Energy- Supply chain partnership @ doing, learning, changing, adjusting, synchronizing,
sharing new knowledge, co-producing knowledge
MTC-Local 103 @ build capacity, diffuse information at the technical level
Mass Energy - MIT (@ sharing knowledge, experience, enhance the network
Chapter IV
4. Conclusions from the case and further
implications
I start this section by drawing the most relevant findings from my analysis and draw both
implications for the case itself and for broader practices. I conclude with more general
lessons that may contribute knowledge to the current environmental management field and
technological innovation.
4.1 Findings and Implications from the Case Study
1. Finding: Designing a framework to maintain inter-organizationalpatterns
There are strategies to build entrepreneurial networks that depend on the use of
preexisting structures, would they be programs, processes or organizations (Baker, 2000).
These networks can also be built by creating new structures that will enable different actors
with common goals and motivations to come together around a 'new forum'. Finally, the
success of inter-organizational interactions depends on how managers and entrepreneurs
maintain the discussion and linkages with other parties. The Solar-to-market initiative
highlights the importance of the forms of organizational coordination which govern its
outcomes. The design of the technology development and its area of diffusion depend
highly on the actors acting on the conception network, in this case, MTC and SEBANE.
However, in the implementation phase this hierarchical model can generate resistance and
derail the courses of actions that are fundamental to the implementation of green
technologies.
A cooperative model set by networks present issues of accountability: The case
demonstrates that although networks create a dynamic among organizations, they also lack
of structures to define clearly mechanisms for accountability. Because the initiative wanted
to leverage the grants to support Massachusetts' economy through a network or
organizations (e.g. manufacturers, suppliers, distributors) some companies that participated
in the solicitations argue that there was no fair competition as it could not have restrained
companies from other states to participate. For instance, Mr. Richard Michaud from the
Department of Energy thinks that although the initiative attempts to create a market, it is
somewhat closed, not perfect. Ideally, any competitor could enter the solicitations,
however, the network created by the initiative benefits primarily local companies.
Some institutional arrangements from the Solar-to-market initiative presented
'Disadvantages, because the business community pushes for the implementation of technologies that they
already have, they want to sell their stocks no matter if the price its cheaper somewhere else(...)"- as
expressed by Laxmi Rao, project manager of the Solarpower initiative at MIT. Also, in
regard to the consensus building effort, there are perceptions that the process could have
been more participatory. Some argued that the initial phases of the program design were
driven, which might have constrained opportunities for innovation and better adoption of
the programs. As a result, for example, some smaller companies and grantees distrust
SEBANE.
Other issues of accountability relate to the lack of intermediate infrastructures for the
creation of solar energy markets i.e. training, equipment, education before the initiative was
rolled out. Partially, the initiative assumed a great leap from policy making to
implementation. As noted in the case, although the RET foresaw to sponsor outreach
programs, the focus was to create a market; hence, SEBANE and MTC disregarded aspects
about capacity building that were necessary to make the transition to a market of green
technologies. For instance, the installations require certain technologies -invertors- that
small local companies (e.g. Solectria) are producing but they do not comply with the
standards. As a result, these technologies are currently being bought from a company that
imports them from Germany. The traditional focus from policy to implementation
(market), may have not allowed to clearly determining the structures that needed to be in
place to support the technological transition.
Implication: A democratic approach topolig implementation would include reaching back
in the polig process framework to include the polig formulation deliberations as a means to help
define the polig goals by talking with the affected parties well before the polig is adopted by the
poligmaker. (deLeon, P., 2002)
Environmental green technological ventures demand a clear and solid consensus
building process that will emphasize in the creation of mechanisms to: (1) implement a
systems-thinking approach that attempts to analyze policy based on inter-organizational
relationships in order to identify strategic structures that will make the implementation
efforts more effective. (2) Promote a setting of experimentation and learning where actors
expose their goals, motivations and problems to craft a collective action plan through a
planning process. (3) Identify that technological developments affect diverse social actors
who possess valuable knowledge, experience and linkages to the communities that are the
end user and beneficiaries of green technologies. Thus, a logical step is to broadening the
design phase and includes alternative actors such as customers, technicians, unions, etc. and
(4) foster a solid environment for renegotiating the diverse stakes of the various stakeholders
will help maintain the engaged actors from early stages of the policy project to the actual
implementation. This continuity can help achieve the long-term character of public policies.
2. Finding: Patterns ofinter-organizational relationsips
Sharing of operational capacity. Green technological developments foster inter-
organizational sharing of operational resources and knowledge to build capacity. For
instance, sharing of resources took place between Mass Energy and the City of Newton
through their established work with the community and the City's progressive participation
in programs for adopting green technologies. Similarly, the City of Newton when applying
to the Solar-to-market grants made the strategic decision to look for Mass Energy as the
right partner, because of its experience and capacity in addressing community issues.
Sharing of Knowledge and Information: Despite the studies and reports on the
renewable energy market provided by private consultants, MTC did not have the total
knowledge to develop the programs to deploy distributed generation systems such as PVs.
By partnering with SEBANE, MTC looked for a strategic partner that had experience in the
field and that could expand the networks for the various programs. Furthermore, SEBANE
through this partnership and its industry knowledge had the capacity to influence policy
making in the way regulatory proceeding were carried out i.e. interconnection standards.
Implication: There are opportunities for policy innovation outside traditional
spheres. Innovation is fostered when knowledge and operational capacity are shared.
Traditionally, innovation for technological development has come from the knowledge and
practices of public agencies and private firms R&D departments. The case studied
evidences new opportunities for shaping green technological development. It demonstrates
that innovation also derives from the interaction among the diverse actors involved in the
implementation of the technology. Information plays a very important role in the
technology diffusion process, and the adoption of technologies by some users is itself an
important mode of information transfer to other parties. By looking outside the traditional
focus of who provides the information and examining what interactions promote
information sharing, there is an opportunity for public managers and entrepreneurs to
manage more effectively the transition to technology innovation.
Moreover, because the process of adopting a technology can be risky due to
uncertainties (i.e. effectiveness, costs) and requires information about the benefits and details
of the applications of the technologies because time is a determinant factor for the diffusion
of the technologies. The management of information and knowledge demands technical
and operational capabilities that can be supported by leveraging coordination among the
diverse actors participating in the development. Thus, learning to manage green
technological ventures requires an examination of how these actors become engaged in
networks. The interactions and collaborative decision-making process created through
these networks can affect this rate of diffusion of green technologies. To achieve this,
"interaction between experts and the public must consist of a dialogue between the different
parties involved, and not jus one-way education" (Rip et al, 1995). Through the study of the
operations stage of the solar venture, the case demonstrates that the understanding of the
details and knowledge embedded in "the bottom" - that of installers, users, and distributors
- offers a strong basis for policy innovation. In addition, once these actors start to interact
in the implementation phase, they co-produce new knowledge which provides more
background for policy-processes. This leads public managers and entrepreneurs to think
about the importance of introducing both this knowledge and promoting these interactions
early on in the policy process.
Finding: Focus on existing structures and systems
Strategic choices along the case demonstrate that the initiative did foresee this
transitional phase of technological change. For instance, MTC selected grantees to create
clusters where experienced organizations had already established networks. Mass Energy
had worked in the City of Newton with solar energy systems and had a good data of
interested homeowners, where people were also more aware of energy issues and trusted
Mass Energy. MIT's cluster evidences key educational objectives from the Initiative, which
takes advantage the available resources for research and experimentation. Thus, by defining
clusters with knowledgeable and experienced actors, MTC strategically facilitated the
diffusion and implementation of the technologies.
Implication: The cluster concept promoted by the initiative fits very well with the
notion of networks. Policy makers can learn from these strategic choices to push
technologies from their transitional phase. The technological challenge transcends its pure
mechanics and demands managers to focus also on organizational processes. The
implications for practitioners are to craft the mechanisms i.e. learning systems, incentives,
define monitoring systems, communication systems and outreach activities for the
technological development, experimentation and implementation. These systems can help
leverage coordination of the networks. As expressed by Leslie Grossman from Mass
Energy:
'All the clusters to some extent are tied together through MTC and I certainly would not
want everyone to recreate the wheel. I do think that we all should learn from each other,
and help each other. MIT has certainly developed its own version based on something
that we have already done: some of the outreach at the beginning our pre-commitment
concept (..) We have also borrowed from other sources when we put together the RTfor
equpment, I started off contacting some folks in Sacramento who had experience in bulk
purchase equpment and I startedfrom what they gave Me"14
In sum, decisions from the case reflect that the design of the technological venture took
into account both co-production factors and the interactive organizational pattern of policy
analysis and policy-making.
Finding: Organizational structures and relationships matter
Policy analysis and policy-making include both organization processes and design.
Actors involved in a green technological environmental venture play different roles, not only
as regulated entities but also as active players in the policy-making process. Throughout the
developmental process of the case, I have found that as organizations assume more than one
functional role, they increase their potential to build entrepreneurial networks because dual
roles encourage building ties across boundaries (Baker, 2000). Nevertheless, these dual
functions can also spur conflict and competition in particular in traditional organizations
designed around normative principles.
In the endeavor studied, there are high levels of interdependence between the systems
and structure and therefore, public managers and entrepreneurs must coordinate those
54 Interview with Leslie Grossman from the Massachusetts Energy Consumers Alliance. May 2003.
actions. These structures and systems are more complex and require more planning and
coordination of actions. The "work flows" or activities in these endeavors require a
reciprocal type of interdependence whereby each of the players and responsibilities are
inherently linked to others. These systems require collaboration and trust as their processes
demand realignments and managers and organizations are increasingly finding more linkages
outside their own structures that require partnerships and alliances (Tushman et al, 1997)
Implications: Policy-making processes can foster a framework in which knowledge and
decisions co-produced at the different levels of the developmental process should feedback
policy design. This implies that public managers can adopt learning systems that will help to
build learning organizations so that policies can constantly be realigned with the ultimate
public goals. For example, organizations can learn from best practices, by monitoring the
ongoing operations and keeping track of the lessons while dispersing the problems and
solutions through systematic but informal sessions in order to maintain improvement and
performance. The project studied can incorporate a knowledge management system i.e.
library of project, whereby organizations from one cluster can refer to others' and share the
learning obtained and feedback the process of the ongoing venture. The way managers
manage the interactions among different actors and control the events at the various levels
(e.g. in the design, negotiation, operation) can determine in great manner the effectiveness of
this learning processes.
3. Finding: Barriers to technology development are not only technological
The case and interviewees stressed that market and regulatory barriers to the solar green
technologies are crucial to their deployment, assumption that fits into the traditional policy
analysis. However, my research process has demonstrated that barriers do not only remain
on these two sides. As encountered in the literature review, which is supported by the case,
the social interactions and organizational structures are as relevant as the market and
regulatory issues when implementing these technological developments. This suggests that
policy-making can incorporate the dynamics, innovations and learning that take place along
the inter-organizational patterns evidenced in green technological developments. These
technological developments require that both organizations and policy be adaptive, which
can be achieved given the framework of interaction fostered by a Cooperative
Environmental Management. Likewise, the adoption of an open planning framework that
allows for dialogue, debate and self-assessments can complement the patterns of interaction
across sectors as found in the case. In sum, an inter-organizational management approach
can foster adaptive learning (Senge, 1990) and policy innovation, which are essential to
manage the challenges of the technological transition.
The current focus of the technology diffusion and development may be too narrow. It
often concentrates in technology performance, risks, compliance and financial factors, but
overlooks the social structures; however, this creates a barrier and an opportunity
simultaneously. A shift toward more energy sustainable systems requires not only regulation
and market incentives. It also demands new strategies to foster and manage the emerging
interactions among the diverse players that are affected or benefited by the technological
development. As seen in the case, technicians have broken a barrier to the deployment of
solar panels once they have learned about it, and they are willing to engage in training
activities sponsored by trusted fellows from other unions. Because Local 103 has the
experience, resources and attitude to transfer knowledge, the networks from the solar-to-
market demonstrate to be more effective. Similarly, SEBANE, as an important association
was able influence the definition of regulation for new interconnection standards to make it
feasible for the PV systems to enter into the grid. To complement the effort, NStar
streamlined the interconnections so that initial adopters of the technologies can feed and sell
energy that they produce to the utility. As a result of the collaborations among diverse
social actors, technological barriers are reduced.
Implication: I conclude that technology and policy go hand with hand as well as their
developmental processes. The role for public managers and entrepreneurs is to foster the
inter-organizational relationships highlighted throughout the thesis. They should also
prepare to maintain these dynamics along the policy process and control the outcomes
systematically so that they can realign the social and organizational systems more consistently
and effectively. Moreover, when managing green technologies the aforementioned
managers should not only be concerned about handing off the technology but also managing
the process during and after the technology is adopted. And yet bring those adopters
during the planning phase, given the frameworks mentioned in finding 1 and 2. By
implementing a consensus building approach whereby stakeholders can interact and
participate in the policy process, they will be able to provide input for technological change.
By fostering social experiments with solar technologies (e.g. clusters) followed by interactive
panels for feedback and evaluation (e.g. from local task forces to open forums, to monthly
meetings) the parties benefited can expose their ideas along the adoption phase. Thus,
public managers can enhance the relationship between technology development and policy-
making.
4. Finding: Mobilizing social structures
'In very fluid, unstructured decisions situations, where conditions are changing and polig responses
are experimental, the only way affected parties can monitor these situations and exert any influence
is to be involved andparticpate in the ongoing [polig] process" (Callon, 1995).
Another pattern that I discovered throughout the implementation phase of the initiative
relates to the capacity of organizations and managers to mobilize social actors when seeking
the public value. In the Solar-to-market initiative, Mass Energy and MIT have started to
work with public schools to create a coalition that will contribute to a more effective
acceptance of the technologies from society. With the objective of educating and
influencing behavior, the civil society can become engaged in the endeavor. Also, the case
of the task-force created in the City of Newton represents a leadership role of how civic
members can contribute to manage the environment. By solving problems together with
the city administration and creating a discussion forum in monthly meetings, both the city
and the task force are advancing to become a pioneer and example to the region. These
circumstances are reinforced by the experience and trust built in by Mass Energy in the field
of solar energy within the community and yet, is materialized as public servants are being
trained in installations so that they can teach other cities how to go about adopting these
green technologies. Finally, the role that Local 103 plays in the Initiative demonstrated the
potential that organizations have to fulfill alternative activities other than their strict
function. Mobilizing for instance the knowledge embedded in the Unions as they are
interested in educating, in shifting from the traditional energy paradigm provides a simple
example of how managers in both spheres can leverage these resources.
Implication: "Sustainability is a measure of adaptability and depends upon people working together
to modify their own behavior and their institutions" (Pezzoli, 1998).
Managing networks effectively can lead to innovation. Change can be managed through
both formal policies but it is necessary to leverage the informal networks among and within
organizations. Managing social control systems can help managers and leaders drive
innovation and change. This implies that entrepreneurs and public managers may be skillful
in creating the conditions under which individuals and organizations can obtain these
sources of informal power.
The success of green technologies implementation depends on great proportion in structural
and cultural conditions in which civic society adopts them (e.g. adequate and efficient use).
Moreover, it also depends on the way stakeholders are involved in the technology
development (Weaver, 2000) and policy process as they become both beneficiaries and
proponents of the technological transition, as illustrated by the case. Thus, it is necessary
that public managers foster strong and legitimate frameworks for open participation and
planning such as local community forums and public technology 'showcases'. On the other
hand, they can partner with schools and research institutions and assign multiple roles to
other groups i.e. unions, trades, community groups by formalizing task-forces and including
them in the policy discussions.
5. Finding: Policy is adaptive, learning-oriented and interactive
"Polig-oriented learning (that) considers changes over time regarding the distribution ofpolig knowledge and
polig positions of the various groups involved in the policy analysis andpolig-making process" (Susskind et
al, 2001)
The developmental analysis of the Solar-to-market initiative evidences that (1) policy
continues; it does not stop once the grants are allocated and the technology is approved.
There is a continuous learning process that comes from implementation and the operation
level that must provide basis for redesign and policy innovation; (2) policy should be
adaptive. Policy is meant to provide long-term commitments not to be threatened,
however, from the case it is evident that while long-term goals prevail, there are
opportunities for policy innovation through experimentation, knowledge sharing and
institutional adaptation that did not threatened the viability of the policy project; (3) policy
process should be inclusive by creating a framework to incorporate the interests and values
of the actors involved in the implementation phase, early on the stages of policy design and
in the technology development process (Schot, J., 2001), (4) policy-making demands a
framework that provides consensus building practices to allow for negotiation and
discussion of the diverse interests so that decision makers can realign the public goals. This
calls for a framework of "network planning' and cooperative management that will allow for
detail, concise knowledge at the bottom to close the loop of the policy-making process.
Implication: The strategies for managing green technology environmental ventures
must consider impacts in the technology development phase by creating formal
arrangements that will allow to implement feedback and learning systems to adapt to
demands such as "each site is unique" - as seen in the case - while involving users and
impacted communities to co-produce the development of the technologies. Because of the
social dimension and organizational demands from a technological shift to solar energy
systems, public managers and entrepreneurs can seize a more adaptive approach to managing
this type of green technological developments. For instance, these managers may design
experiments, while setting indicators, monitoring the results and evaluating the results in a
concerted and planning framework to bring the various constituencies to the table so that
they can take on roles to define the path of the development. Their feedback can
contribute to solve contingencies along the process and will maintain the diverse actors
engaged as it sets a more interdependent and interactive approach to implementation while
designing policies that affect us all.
As entrepreneurs are interested in pursuing a kind of market, a learning-by-doing
methodology will match the strategic niche management derived from understanding
information withheld at certain levels of the operation phase. For public managers, this
approach will contribute to the creation of an Intermediate Technological Development that
supports a sustainable development. Public managers can then learn to assign and share
responsibilities, enhance the setting for cross sectoral activities as the relationships between
their organizations and citizens develop trust, interdependence and communication. By
providing legitimacy and voice to a community task force, for instance, in the development
of X venture, citizens can complement the complexity of managing green technological
environmental ventures. Thus, an adaptive management approach that promotes learning,
cooperation and experimentation will support a framework for social learning (Shindler, B.&
Cheek, K, 1999).
4.2 Recommendations for practice
When crafting a green technological environmental venture public managers and
entrepreneurs may think about:
1. Designing a clear framework for setting goals, policies, responsibilities and negotiation
terms during the technological development and implementation phase, from design to
commercialization. There are challenges that emerge from the approaches to analyze policy
processes; these revolve around the management of those interactions and maintain the
different actors accountable, how do create a legal and administrative framework to support
civic groups without threatening the roles of the established institutions? We have
evidenced that a green technological shift demands that various actors come together to
share resources and capabilities. Thus, managers should be prepared to craft a consensus
building process thereby the diverse set of actors involved in the technological challenge can
interact cooperatively, legitimize their institutional relationships and remain accountable.
When stakeholders such as public, private and civic groups dialogue and solve problems
supported by an open and legal framework, the public value that the green technological
development seeks to achieve will be enhanced. Moreover, this process will enable a
cooperative environmental management by which the new knowledge co-produced by the
actors at the "bottom" will be part of the policy design and decision-making processes, and
therefore will determine the new outcomes. As a result, a more egalitarian process will
support innovation and societal change needed to adopt the technological transition.
2. In pursuit of green technological developments organizations demand a high degree of
interdependence while sharing knowledge and operational capabilities. New institutional
arrangements build up; therefore, public managers and entrepreneurs must be prepared to
handle new organizational patterns so that the public value remains. As relationships are
consolidated or threatened, it is the role of managers to realign the organizational systems.
The focus of the technological development reaches out the sphere of traditional policy and
market instruments; it demands for a fully apprehension of inter-organizational analysis as
part of the policy-making process in the environmental arena. For instance, the importance
of partnering with existing organizational structures will contribute to the effectiveness of
technological developments once a framework for interaction has been carefully developed.
Additionally, managers can assure a more effective implementation of the technology
developments as they focus on the coordination of activities and planning process when
thinking systematically about arranging organizational structures which include people,
formal and informal systems.
Consequently, public managers and entrepreneurs will promote learning organizations
that are adaptive to change, while leveraging the informal and formal arrangements to foster
a network setting. Networks working toward the public value support the transition of
technological change because the knowledge and detailed information co-produced at the
various levels of implementation can become a great resource for policy innovation.
3. A technology innovation does not only limit to the materialization of a device, but
also comprises the design of social action. A way to introduce technology through
experimentation is by making the process socially transparent: integrating learning
mechanisms (feedback from operation experiences, reactions after changes, self-
observations). Technology developments are not only constrained by regulatory and market
barriers as it has traditionally been argued. Similarly, opportunities for technological change
may not only be the focus of technology forcing policies or market incentives.
Technological developments such as a shift from traditional energy systems require a change
of social structures and institutional setting that demand high levels of coordination and
information flows so that all stakeholders participate in the co-production and adoption of
the technologies. Hence, policy-making and management of green technological
environmental ventures must also focus in the inter-institutional collaborations required for
achieving the technological transitions as this would facilitate the adoption of the general
public. Because institutional structures can represent an ample set of stakeholders from
society including the public, private and third sectors and influence societal change, public
managers and entrepreneurs can integrate this new focus into their practices in order to
implement green technologies. When policymakers and managers think about introducing
these developments to the public, the answer may not be as easy as putting them on retail
stores, or simply creating a market. In brief, technology development and policy processes
must accompany each other. Therefore, policy should be adaptive allowing for learning
while achieving a collaborative closed loop policy process, by which resources are shared by
networks of organizations that learn one from each other.
4. There is a type of behavioral change that technology demands from society, which can
be reached by mobilizing civic groups without threatening public institutions. When
seeking to enhance the public value, the social structures that exist among communities can
determine the success of the adoption of the new technologies. Social actors need to create
some type of legal framework in order to legitimize their goals and actions. Strong
institutions and multi-sector networks are required to support participatory processes, to
provide the legal terrain and the empowerment of the citizens and to incorporate the bottom
line knowledge into an institutional framework to achieve social change and more
democratic decisions which will gain public support, and assure that resources and outcomes
are distributed equally. Providing civic actors with active roles, whose voices are
accountable in the aforementioned framework, will release the potential of civic groups to
continue influencing the path that green technologies may take in the future.
5. Green technological environmental ventures can be managed through an experimental
and learning-oriented approach. Learning involves building the linkages to create trust,
communication and intrinsically long-term ties that promote continuous channels for
feedback. An attitude toward learning will contribute to leverage the knowledge that is built
in within organizations and will foster new knowledge from the interactions that are created
in the organizational dynamics envisioned. This new knowledge may be more practice-
based and grounded on trial and error, on learning by doing, and the capacity of
organizations to adopt this type of strategic niche management may enable innovation.
4.3 Conclusion
I argue that green technological environmental ventures require leaders who have
systemic views of the world. Leaders in learning organizations demand a set of skills that
can help them build a shared vision and to foster more systemic patterns of thinking so that
people within organizational structures can expand their capabilities to shape their future. If
we think about sustainability, the transition from our traditional developments to a new
mental and practical model for development demands this core principle. I consider that
organizations, public managers and entrepreneurs can learn and improve their abilities to
foster communication and collaborative frameworks to build learning organizations- a type
of network mindset.
Green technological ventures seek the public value while advocating for environmental
protection and improvement, and therefore, it is a field of concern not only for public
managers but also for social entrepreneurs and private managers. By managing the design
and development of green environmental ventures with the suggested strategies, these can
be more socially viable and sustainable. Learning from small systems provides basis for
policy innovations that is necessary for paving the way to sustainability as practices, such as
energy consumption demand not incremental changes but a system transformation. The
importance of learning to manage and handle technology in society broadens the
understanding of technological development in opportunities for social learning in search of
a more sustainable development
Moreover, a learning mindset will match easily with the goals of the transition to a more
sustainable development. If policy processes are moving outside the sphere of the
government, and private actors and civic groups are taking on new roles, the importance of
learning how to manage these interactions in environmental ventures in their innovative
phase can determine the outcomes of the policy project. This learning-to -manage can be
approached with the understanding of how the ventures develop, seeking for patterns and
then learning to approach more systematically the congruencies that exist when crafting an
environmental venture. "Learning is a precarious value - one that today's institutions find
difficult to acknowledge in practice (...) Indeed, modifying and building institutions so that
they can recognize and support long-term learning poses significant challenges"(Lee, 1993).
This advocates for managers to create an institutional and organizational culture that enables
experimentation and learning
We may think about a new institutional vision that sees public agencies not only as
providers of solutions, but as facilitators and partners with citizens to help find and produce
collaborative solutions and outcomes correspondingly. The core of adaptation through
experimentation can also help develop new institutional arrangements, and therefore
allowing applying experiments to institutions themselves. For instance, these experiments
can explore the relationships within and among agencies and stakeholders to find new ways
to promote flexibility, cooperative management, and a long-term outlook (Johnson, B, 1999)
which builds a pillar for sustainable development
Similarly, public managers and entrepreneurs should strive to unlock the learning built in
actors from diverse constituencies i.e. communities, unions, small companies, while creating
interactive mechanisms to adopt this new knowledge to feedback the policy design process.
I consider that a system of intermediate/transitional technology development based on
smaller working units within larger systems (Schumacher, 1973), which have acquired
valuable knowledge while working cooperatively can contribute to a more equal and
sustainable development.
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Appendix A. List of Interviewees.
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Name Organization Title Dates of Interview
Dr. Edward Kern SEBANE and President November 2002
MIT Professor December 2002
February 2003
May 2003
Mr. Dick Tinsman Massachusetts Director of the January 2003
Technology Green Buildings
Collaborative Program
Mr. Sam Nutter Massachusetts Director of the February 2003
Technology Solar-to-market
Collaborative Initiative
Mr. David City of Newton Buildings May 2003
Tannozzini Department
Coordinator
Ms. Leslie Grossman Mass Energy Project Coordinator May 2003
Mr. Martin Aikens IBEW Local 103 Business Agent May 2003
Mrs. Laxmi Rao Massachusetts Project Manager June 2003
Institute of
Technology - MIT
Mr. Paul Lyons Zapotec Energy Chief Executive June 2003
Officer
Mr. Dennis Smith U.S. Department Of June 2003
Energy I
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Appendix B. Sample of interview questions used to develop the case study.
Story.
* Did you (Mr. Kern) and the founding team originally see S2M as being "new and clean
infrastructure" or did that idea grow out of work with other distributed generation and
renewable energy systems? If it did so what triggered that?
. What does make the Initiative to be more public-oriented? Couldn't it just be led by
business interests and let the market drive it?
* Has Sebane, or MTC worked with any other European/Japan counterparts at all at any
stage during it's development maybe because they have more expertise in the manufacturing
and deployment of the technology?
. Where there instances were the initiative did not look favorable and could have collapsed?
If so, How did the players overcome it?
. What inter-organizational relationships were important to the development of the S2M
intiative
Actors, motivations and goals
* What was the initial goal of the S2M? What were its main motivations i.e. public concerns,
opportunities for technological deployment, etc?
* Has the initial goal of S2M changed since its conception? If so, why and how did this
happen. Did the interaction with new actors coming in trigger this change?
. Who has led the Initiative since its conception? Has its mission changed? Have the
activities in which SEBANE engaged changed?
" How did SEBANE deal with adding competencies? Did it bring in other actors to help?
. Because we are concerned with technology, which has an impact on society, what do you
see as the major obstacles to the initial goals?
* Has SEBANE and MTC worked together to reframe new challenges?
Relationships
* Did SEBANE and MTC interact with other parties in order to get off the ground, to
expand and to the carrying through of the venture at critical moments? Have these actors
remained involved with the Initiative up to this point? When other parties become
involved, do they remain involved? How, if at all, do those relationships change or grow?
e Can you describe your relationship with MTC and the RET? Why and how did you guys
start to work together? What were their main motivations (compliance with regulation,
public interest, curiosity, etc.)? Were any key people essential in putting all that
together? What role did they play?
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. Which government agencies have been most helpful? How have they been helpful? Have
you seen any interest from State or Federal agencies? How do you think they could/would
be helpful, and have SEBANE or MTC approached them?
* Is there a different dynamic between SEBANE, MTC, Evergreen Solar, Conservation
Services Group in a market with high monetary interests and first-mover advantages? Are
these interactions as cooperative, as friendly, constructive?
Outcomes
. What does make the S2M initiative set apart? Do you think that it is desirable to have these
initiatives as well-managed experiments to see what goes wrong before scaling it up?
* Can you mention what are the innovations that SEBANE and MTC have come up with in
order to make the Initiative more viable? Where have those ideas emerged?
* Have you seen any kind of innovation brought about i.e. organizational, incentives,
economic mechanisms, etc throughout the process of the Initiative? Can you mention some
results important for your organization and the overall goal? If so, how would you
characterize the outcomes of the Initiative?
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